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I. Introduction 
       The foundation of civil liberty in 
modern democratic societies is the due proc-
ess of law, the guarantee that no person shall 
be deprived of his or her freedom without a 
just cause, nor receive any punishment not 
duly and legally prescribed, nor suffer any 
punishment that would be inhumane or de-
structive of dignity.  In the United States 
equal justice for all people before the law, 
during times of peace and war, is enshrined 
not only in the Constitution but also in the 
international laws that bind us and connect 
us with the rest of the world.  The promise 
of fair and equal justice is one of the princi-
ples our country was founded upon and an 
ideal that should earn us the respect and ad-
miration of the world.     It is, however, an 
ideal, one that Americans and citizens of 
other free nations have done too little to 
make an everyday reality.  Arbitrary arrests, 
unfair trials, torture and degrading treatment 
are not remnants of the distant past, and nei-
ther are they the sole province of oppressed 
countries controlled by strongman dictators.  
For democratic societies they are not entirely 
new, either.  In the United States, for exam-
ple, the use of torture in correctional facili-
ties and by police officers throughout the 
country has not been uncommon in the last 
several decades (Conroy 33).  The torture of 
captured enemies during wartime by Ameri-
can soldiers occurred as well, during the 
Vietnam War (Greer 372). 
 These violations, however shameful, 
do not approach the scope or scale of the 
most recent assault against the principle of 
due process in the United States.  Beginning 
during the immediate the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, 
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 and ending only with its departure 
from power in January 2009, the 
administration of President George 
W. Bush placed suspected terrorists un-
der arrest for indefinite periods of time 
in a manner contrary to the laws of war, 
denied those prisoners fair trials, authorized 
the use interrogation techniques, such as 
stress positions and simulated drowning 
(also called “waterboarding”) that are tortur-
ous or degrading to human dignity, and sent 
suspected terrorists overseas for the purpose 
of interrogations where torture had a high 
likelihood of occurring (the so-called 
“extraordinary renditions”).  The Bush ad-
ministration asserted that these acts are le-
gally justified by presidential military au-
thority and beyond the ability of any law to 
prevent (Greer 384).  One effect of these ac-
tions was to reduce the importance of obey-
ing international law and respecting the hu-
manity of prisoners in the minds of Ameri-
can personnel, leading to situations where 
abusive behavior went beyond the original 
intent of the administration, such as the infa-
mous abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib 
Prison in Iraq by American military police 
(Gourevitch 103).    
  It is tempting, in times of great na-
tional crisis, to act with less restraint than 
the principles of justice would otherwise al-
low.  Let it not be said that Al Qaeda is not a 
serious threat, because it does pose a grave 
danger, and in a way that the United States is 
not used to fighting against.  It is true that 
international terrorist networks cannot be 
defeated with conventional military doctrine, 
but that doesn’t mean that Americans have 
to abandon these principles, especially not 
for the sake of measures which may seem 
very effective and “tough” but are actually 
counterproductive.   The closest historical 
analog to the behavior of the Bush admini-
stration towards prisoners is the internment 
of Japanese-American citizens during the 
Second World War, supposedly to prevent 
sabotage, a decision which was ordered by 
President Roosevelt and backed by the Su-
preme Court.  It is well-known today that the 
danger of sabotage was very small and the 
internment is considered one of the great 
shames of the United States’ history. The 
mistreatment of detainees and disregard for 
international law over the past several years 
has not only been unnecessary but may have 
actually strengthened our enemies, and there 
is little doubt that the attempts to institution-
alize and legally justify the use of torture 
will also go down as one of the most shame-
ful parts of American history. 
 Other countries that have tried to cir-
cumvent the rule of law during times of war 
or national crisis have suffered for it.  The 
experimental tactics used by the United 
Kingdom against Irish Catholics only exac-
erbated the threat of the Irish Republican 
Army and left a black mark on British his-
tory.  The Israeli government’s attempts to 
institute legal coercive interrogations in a 
limited manner led to a spiraling pattern of 
systemic abuse.  Both cases illuminate dif-
ferent ways that ignoring international law 
can and has harmed the interests of the 
United States. 
 The indefinite detention of so-called 
“unlawful enemy combatants,” denying such 
persons access to impartial courts when they 
are in custody, and the use of certain interro-
gation techniques amounting to torture and 
degrading treatment are all violations of 
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 multiple instruments of interna-
tional law.  They have also hurt the 
interests of the United States by dam-
aging its reputation and moral authority 
abroad and encouraging ordinary people 
of foreign nations to take up arms against 
us.  It will benefit the United States to ob-
serve international law in all future endeav-
ors. 
II. Overview of International Law  
Regarding Prisoners 
1.Introduction 
 International law comes in many 
forms; unlike municipal (i.e., domestic) law, 
there is not an orderly hierarchy of official 
law-making bodies in international politics, 
and for that reason international law arises 
from the consensus of states.  Treaties are 
written agreements among two or more 
states, and in modern times they are proba-
bly the most important type of international 
law (Shaw 89).1 A large number of treaties 
that regulate state behavior towards prison-
ers are binding on the United States, many 
of which reflect broader principles and ide-
als.  For that reason, it will be sufficient to 
focus on treaties in an analysis of what inter-
national laws regulate how the United States 
must treat detainees in the war on terror. 
      There are two major types of interna-
tional law that affect how states must treat 
those in their power: humanitarian law and 
human rights law.  International humanitar-
ian law, more formally known as jus in 
bello, regulates state practice in times of 
war; it prescribes how states must treat pris-
oners of war and civilians in occupied terri-
tories, among other things (Shaw 1055).  
International human rights law regulates the 
way states treat people in their power in gen-
eral; in many cases such law explicitly for-
bids the derogation of certain rights even 
during wars or emergencies (256).  Treaties 
representing both types of law are binding 
on the United States and thus are relevant to 
its conduct in the war against terrorism.      
2. Categories of protected persons 
      The Four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and their Additional Protocols are the 
core of international humanitarian law, and 
are universally recognized as law (ICRC).  
They prescribe legal protections for any 
imaginable class of person who may come 
under the control of a belligerent power in 
the course of an armed conflict.  The Third 
1949 Geneva Convention (hereafter GC III) 
protects prisoners of war.  Its provisions ap-
ply during any period of international armed 
conflict, regardless of the existence of an 
official declaration of war or recognition of 
a state of war by any party to the fighting.  
GC III defines “prisoners of war” to include 
regular soldiers of a party to the conflict, 
duly authorized civilian crews, laborers, cor-
respondents, and mechanics that accompany 
military units, and members of the merchant 
marine. Also included are members of mili-
tias or resistance movements that follow cer-
tain rules: having a clear command structure; 
wearing a distinctive mark that can be distin-
guished from a distance; carrying arms 
openly; and obeying the laws and customs of 
warfare. Also included are soldiers of a gov-
ernment not recognized by a Detaining 
Power, which don’t necessarily need to meet 
all the same conditions as militias to qualify 
for POW treatment.   Furthermore, belliger-
ent captives whose status under GC III are in 
doubt must be treated as if they qualify as 
prisoners of war until a “competent 
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 tribunal” can determine otherwise.   
      The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion (hereafter GC IV) protects civil-
ians not otherwise protected by the 
other three conventions and who are in 
the power of a foreign state during a war 
or occupation, if they are nationals of a 
state belligerent to the conflict.  Persons that 
participate in a conflict without qualifying 
for protection under GC III would, if they 
are nationals of a state party to the conflict, 
be entitled to the protections of GC IV 
(Dormann 50).  The First Additional Proto-
col to the Geneva Conventions (hereafter AP 
I) provides additional rules for the conduct 
of international conflicts. It has not been 
ratified by the United States, but some of its 
provisions, notably Article 75, are com-
monly regarded as reflecting customary in-
ternational law and are thus binding regard-
less (Sands 150).  Article 75 describes 
“Fundamental Guarantees,” the basic rights 
accorded to anyone in the power of state 
party to a conflict who is not otherwise pro-
tected by another provision of AP I or any of 
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.  Civilian 
nationals of a state that is not a party to a 
given conflict, for example, would not qual-
ify for protected person status under the 
Conventions and would therefore fall under 
Article 75’s protection.  Article 75 (or more 
precisely the customary law it reflects, in the 
case of the United States) thus makes it im-
possible for anyone to be in the power of a 
state without having some guarantee of pro-
tection under international humanitarian law 
(Dormann 73). 
     In the early days of the United Na-
tions two legal instruments were created 
which were vital to the later development of 
major human rights treaties. The first is the 
UN Charter itself, which states that the UN 
should support universal observance of hu-
man rights in Article 55. The second is the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948, which proclaimed a universal standard 
of rights that should be observed and pro-
tected.  At the time these were not enforce-
able in any meaningful way, although they 
may have become binding to an extent since. 
Their chief importance lies in the road they 
paved toward more concrete legal instru-
ments later on (Shaw 261). 
       The major human rights treaties 
which regulate state behavior towards de-
tainees are the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) 
and the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture, both of which the United States has 
ratified (OHCR).  According to General 
Comment 31 of the Human Rights Commit-
tee, states parties to the ICCPR have an obli-
gation to ensure the rights of all people in 
their jurisdiction or effective control, even if 
they are outside said state’s territory.  Article 
5 of the Torture Convention likewise enjoins 
all state parties to outlaw torture in any terri-
tories under their jurisdiction. 
3. General rights and treatment 
        Part II of GC III describes in gen-
eral terms the rights of POWs, in that they 
are to be treated humanely, given appropri-
ate medical care, and treated without undue 
discrimination.  Part III, which includes Ar-
ticles 17-107, describes POW rights in 
greater detail.  Prisoners of war are only re-
quired to provide accurate information about 
their identities, including, name, rank, and 
social security number or equivalent.  Their 
quarters must be as good as those of  
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 soldiers of the Detaining Power in 
the same area, particularly regarding 
space and bedding allowed, and must 
not be deleterious to the health of pris-
oners, and are not to be located in a 
place that is especially close to combat 
zones.  Food and water must be provided 
sufficiently to keep the prisoners healthy and 
prevent weight loss, and clothing suitable for 
the local climate must be given to the prison-
ers and repaired or replaced as is necessary.  
Camps must be clean and sanitary, and have 
necessary facilities for the medical treatment 
and monthly inspection of prisoners.  All 
prisoners must be allowed to practice their 
religion, and if there is no clerical official to 
provide appropriate services among the pris-
oners then one must be provided by the De-
taining Power.  Discrimination based on 
race, religion, nationality, or language is 
prohibited.  Prisoners must be able to write 
letters to their families informing them of 
their situations whenever they are captured, 
transferred to another camp, or hospitalized, 
and they must be allowed to receive letters 
and send at least two letters of their own per 
month, barring difficulties in procuring 
translators and censors.   
      GC IV allows for the internment of 
persons protected by its provisions only if 
necessary to military security, and guaran-
tees internees largely the same set of rights 
that prisoners of war have under GC III.  It 
states in Article 5 that, unlike GC III, a pro-
tected person engaged in or definitely sus-
pected of hostile activities may be detained 
without being entitled to certain rights other-
wise guaranteed if they would be harmful to 
the security of the occupying power, such as 
the right to communication, although full 
protection must be restored as soon as possi-
ble. 
      Part III of the ICCPR, covering Arti-
cles 6-27, guarantees the right to life, protec-
tion against degrading treatment, discrimina-
tion, and slavery, the right to freedom and 
practice of religion, the right to recognition 
as a person under the law, and the right hu-
man treatment and respect for their dignity 
to everyone under the jurisdiction of a state 
party to the Convention.  According to Arti-
cle 4 certain derogations may be made from 
the Convention only if required by an emer-
gency situation; Article 4 also states that 
such derogations can not be applied toward 
the rights to freedom from torture and dis-
crimination, or the right to free exercise of 
religion. 
4. Fair trial rights 
      GC III provides that prisoners of war 
who are accused of crimes must have fair 
trials in regularly constituted, independent, 
and impartial courts, by the same procedures 
under which soldiers of the detaining power 
would be tried.  Proceedings must be held as 
quickly as possible, and if it is necessary to 
confine a prisoner before said proceedings 
such confinement must last no longer than 
three months.  POWs on trial have the right 
to a qualified advocate,  meet said advocate 
in private, call witnesses in their defense, 
and appeal decisions.  POWs convicted of 
crimes must have their sentences served in 
the same facilities and in the same manner as 
soldiers of the Detaining Power in equiva-
lent situations.  Persons who are protected 
by GC IV have largely the same trial rights 
as prisoners of war, and if convicted should 
be kept separate from other detainees.  Arti-
cle 75 of AP I prohibits any sentence or 
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 punishment from being carried out 
“except pursuant to a conviction 
pronounced by an impartial and regu-
larly constituted court respecting the 
generally recognized principles of regu-
lar judicial procedure…” 
      Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits 
arbitrary detention, mandates that anyone 
charged with a crime be “entitled to a trial 
within a reasonable time…,” and states that 
anyone under arrest has the right to have a 
court review the lawfulness of the arrest and 
order him freed if it is illegal.  Article 14 
guarantees the rights of all persons facing 
criminal charges to a legally established, in-
dependent, impartial court, to be presumed 
innocent before being found guilty, to sum-
mon witnesses in his defense, and to exam-
ine witnesses against him. 
5. Prohibitions against torture and other 
degrading treatment 
      GC III prohibits the use of torture as 
an interrogation method in Article 17 and as 
a method of punishment in Article 87, and in 
Article 130 lists torture as a “grave breach” 
of the Conventions requiring state parties to 
find and bring to trial anyone accused of 
committing it.  Article 32 of GC IV prohibits 
causing physical suffering of protected per-
sons, including torture, and like GC III lists 
torture as a “grave breach” in Article 147.  
Article 75 of AP I prohibits torture and de-
grading treatment under any circumstances 
whatsoever.   Article 7 of the ICCPR prohib-
its torture and degrading treatment, and Arti-
cle 4 lists this as a right that may not be 
derogated in a time of national crisis or 
emergency. 
      The Convention against Torture, as 
might be expected, goes into much greater 
depth on this issue than other relevant trea-
ties.  It defines torture in Article 1 as: 
any act by which severe pain or suf-
fering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when 
such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. 
 
      Article 2 requires state parties to 
take effective measures to ban torture and 
states that nothing whatsoever, even a public 
emergency, can justify torture.  Article 3 
bans sending a person to another country 
where there is a real danger of that person 
being tortured.  Article 5 declares that the 
illegality of torture must extend to all territo-
ries under the jurisdiction of the state parties 
or onboard ships and aircraft registered to 
the state parties.  Article 10 states that any-
one involved in the treatment of detainees 
should be educated on the prohibition of tor-
ture, and Article 11 requires state parties to 
review rules and practices of detention and 
interrogation with an eye toward preventing 
torture.  Article 16 additionally requires state 
parties to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment 
which do not amount to torture as defined in 
article 1” from being committed by public 
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 officials in territories under their 
jurisdiction. 
6. Execution and enforcement 
a. The Red Cross 
 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC or Red 
Cross) is an international non-governmental 
organization that has provided assistance to 
prisoners and the wounded in times of war 
for since the mid-nineteenth century.  It has 
been closely involved with the creation, im-
plementation, execution, and enforcement of 
most instruments of international humanitar-
ian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions and their predecessors (Shaw 1163).   
      International law provides the 
ICRC a special legal mandate to perform 
humanitarian functions during times of inter-
national armed conflict.  GC III guarantees 
the ability of the ICRC to act as a neutral 
protecting power during a conflict; this en-
tails the authority to ensure the shipments of 
mail and relief to and from places of intern-
ment, receive reports about the labor condi-
tions of prisoners, and propose the creation 
of a Central POW Information Agency, 
among others.  Article 125 of GC III com-
mits state parties to assist charitable organi-
zations, especially the ICRC, deliver relief to 
POWs.  Article 126 states that ICRC dele-
gates must have the ability to visit any place 
where prisoners of war are held, employed, 
or transported without restriction and to hold 
interviews with prisoners in private. These 
liberties are not contingent on the ICRC be-
ing recognized as a protecting power by the 
detaining power in question.  GC IV pro-
vides similar powers to the Red Cross re-
garding inspections, relief, and insurance of 
shipments to and from places where persons 
under its protection are detained.   
      Unfortunately, the ICRC is limited 
in its ability to publicly protest against viola-
tions that it observes because of its tradi-
tional stance on confidentiality.  It maintains 
neutrality in order to more fully guarantee its 
access to prisoners, refugees, and other per-
sons that may require its help, so the ICRC 
has very rarely made public its knowledge of 
transgressions against international humani-
tarian law (Shaw 1079). 
b. Prescriptions for domestic enforcement 
    The Geneva Conventions also place 
certain responsibilities on state parties with 
respect to their enforcement.    Both GC III 
and IV require the dissemination of the text 
of the conventions in both peace and war, as 
well as the inclusion of their study in 
courses of military and civil instruction.  
Personnel that have responsibility for pro-
tected persons must have access to copies of 
the conventions at all times and receive spe-
cial instruction as to their provisions.  State 
parties are also required to provide effective 
legal sanctions against committing grave 
breaches,2 bring any person accused of a 
grave breach to trial regardless of national-
ity,3 and to otherwise suppress all acts con-
trary to the Conventions that are not grave 
breaches.   
 The ICCPR requires state parties to 
protect each right guaranteed by its provi-
sions by the force of domestic law.  Articles 
4 and 5 of the Convention against Torture 
require state parties make torture illegal un-
der domestic law and do whatever is neces-
sary to establish jurisdiction over torture in 
any territory under is control.  Articles 6 and 
7 mandate that states parties must arrest any 
person alleged to have violated the  
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 convention and either extradite that 
person or put the case to its own au-
thorities for the purpose of prosecu-
tion.4 
c. Treaty mechanisms 
 Since there was no pre-existing 
organization like the ICRC to manage is-
sues of human rights law, the ICCPR and the 
Torture Convention both set up special com-
mittees with enforcement duties.  Part IV of 
the ICCPR, comprising Articles 28-45, man-
dates the creation of a Human Rights Com-
mittee, whose members are elected by and 
from the states parties to the Covenant.   
State Parties are required to submit reports 
on their efforts to guarantee the rights listed 
in the CCPR one year after it enters into 
force, and the Committee has the power to 
request further reports at any time after-
wards.  The Committee may also receive 
complaints from one state party about an-
other’s alleged failure to fulfill its obliga-
tions under the CCPR and attempt to solve 
any such dispute by mediating negotiations 
between the parties involved if it decides 
that all domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted or unreasonably delayed.5  In cases 
where the Committee is unable to resolve 
and issue it may appoint an ad hoc Commis-
sion to further attempt to create an amicable 
solution.   The Committee also has the re-
sponsibility to submit an annual report of its 
activities to the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.  The Committee can issue 
General Comments that explain and interpret 
the Covenant’s provisions; General Com-
ment 31, mentioned above, is an example of 
such a comment.   
      Article 17 of the Convention against 
Torture prescribes the creation of the Com-
mittee against Torture, a body consciously 
modeled on the Human Rights Committee of 
the ICCPR (Nowak 586).  State parties must 
submit reports to this Committee not just 
one year after the Convention enters into 
force for them but every four years thereaf-
ter as well, in addition to whatever other re-
ports the Committee requests.  In cases 
where well-founded evidence indicates the 
possibility of torture being carried the Com-
mittee can invite the state party concerned to 
cooperate in examining the evidence and 
making observations based upon it.  If it is 
warranted, the Committee may also make a 
confidential inquiry into the matter, which 
may involve visiting the territory of the state 
party in question.  It has similar powers to 
the Human Rights Committee regarding the 
power to mediate disputes between state par-
ties if domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted, and it may also receive communica-
tions from individuals claiming to be victims 
of violations of the Convention if a state 
party with jurisdiction over said individuals 
recognizes the competence of the Committee 
to do so.      
d. UN organizations 
     There are also other organizations 
that are outside of the specific framework of 
the relevant treaties, which are important to 
monitoring and investigating the way prison-
ers and detainees are treated throughout the 
world, including official bodies of the 
United Nations.  One such organization is 
the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR), which is 
the primary executive body of the United 
Nations responsible for human rights.  It co-
ordinates and organizes the efforts of all the 
UN groups with some responsibility for  
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 human rights (Forsythe 4). 
       The Human Rights Council, 
a subsidiary body of the United Nations 
General Assembly, was created in 2006 
in order to more effectively address hu-
man rights violations throughout the world. 
It took over the task from its predecessor, 
the Human Rights Commission, which came 
under intense criticism for the poor human 
rights record of some of its members.  The 
institution of the Council, a body with largely 
similar powers, intended to ameliorate that 
problem by having its members elected by the 
General Assembly (76). It is tasked with per-
forming “Universal Periodic Review,” a proc-
ess that entails the cooperative examination of 
human rights situations in all member states of 
the United Nations.  The Council may also 
receive and discuss credible communications 
regarding “consistent patterns of gross and 
reliably attested violations of all human rights 
and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any 
part of the world and under any circum-
stances,” if domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted. The Human Rights Council also has 
the power, inherited from the Commission, to 
establish “special procedures,” which are man-
dates that empower their holders (who are usu-
ally expert individuals) to investigate, advise, 
and make public reports on specific areas of 
their expertise.  Such mandates may be as-
signed either to specific countries or to the-
matic issues relating to human rights (Shaw 
283). 
      There is such a mandate regarding tor-
ture; the title of the person holding that man-
date is “Special Rapporteur on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”  According to the official web 
page on the OHCHR’s web site, the Special 
Rapporteur has the responsibility to transmit 
appeals and other communications regarding 
torture to state governments, perform fact-
finding missions, and make annual reports to 
the Council and the UN General Assembly.  
He or she can act with far more independence 
than most other legally established human 
rights entities, including the Human Rights 
Council itself, because he or she is not bound 
by the constraints of the usual exhaustion of 
domestic remedies rule (Weissbrodt 693). 6 
e. NGOs 
      There are, of course, many important 
organizations dedicated to protecting human 
rights and investigating breaches of interna-
tional law that are not affiliated with the 
United Nations or any government at all.  Two 
of the most important non-governmental or-
ganizations (or NGOs) that concern them-
selves with the treatment of prisoners and de-
tainees are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International. 
      Human Rights Watch has a relatively 
small membership, made up of about 230 ex-
perienced and influential professionals.  It 
works to promote human rights by conducting 
investigations into alleged abuses of all sorts 
throughout the world, publishing their findings 
publicly (unlike the Red Cross) in order to 
shame and embarrass abusers through media 
attention, and encouraging them to make re-
forms (Korey 309). Through its fact-finding 
and lobbying it also seeks to influence govern-
ments and international organizations through-
out the world, especially the United States 
government (344). 
      Amnesty International, by contrast, is 
a mass-movement organization that draws its 
influence from large grassroots membership.  
Amnesty International performs many activi-
ties draws its influence from large grassroots 
membership.  Amnesty International performs 
many activities  
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 similar to those of Human Rights 
Watch, such as fact-finding, observa-
tion, appealing to governments and re-
porting its findings publicly and widely;  
it also mobilizes its large numbers for 
other tasks, such as large-scale demonstra-
tions, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, 
and protests against policies that infringe on 
human rights (Clark 9).  Amnesty Interna-
tional focuses special attention on prisoners 
that have been illegally detained or abused 
while in custody, although it deals with other 
human rights issues as well (12). 
f. Legal prosecutions and punishments All of 
the aforementioned executive bodies, commit-
tees, and NGOs perform vital tasks such as 
fact-finding, publishing, and engaging with 
abusive actors to change their policies.  Let it 
not be said that what they do is unimportant; 
their operations are necessary to uncovering 
and preventing illegal abuses of detainees.  
None of them, however, have the responsibil-
ity or the power to enforce international law 
the way “enforcement” is commonly thought 
of in domestic law: arresting, charging, trying, 
and punishing individuals that make transgres-
sions against the law.  Historically, that task 
has fallen, for better or for worse, to state gov-
ernments.  
      If an individual commits or orders to 
be committed an act of abuse against a pris-
oner of war, then obviously the government of 
the state to which he is a national has the right 
and duty to put that individual on trial for the 
crime.  If the abuse is ordered or condoned at 
the highest levels of government then, of 
course, there is little chance of such a prosecu-
tion actually taking place.  There is no univer-
sally applicable system of sanction and pun-
ishment in international law as exists in do-
mestic law (Shaw 4).  Therefore, in such situa-
tions the responsibility for capturing and 
prosecuting alleged abusers has usually fallen 
to some other state or group of states, accord-
ing either to the principle of prosecuting of-
fenses committed against themselves or the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. 
      Two of the most important examples 
of the former principle at work are the Tokyo 
and Nuremberg trials of German and Japanese 
leaders and soldiers after the Second World 
War.7  That a state has a legitimate right to 
prosecute those who are alleged to have com-
mitted war crimes against them or their nation-
als, so long as fair trial standards are applied, 
is a longstanding principle of international law 
appealed to by the Allies to justify the trials.   
The “victors’ justice” challenge, the assertion 
that a court is illegitimate because it has been 
created by the winners of a war to judge the 
defeated, was presented by the defendants at 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other ad hoc interna-
tional courts throughout history, but never 
with any success (Boister 32).  The claim that 
the Allies were legally unable to combine their 
jurisdiction and form a single court, which was 
presented by the defendants at the beginning 
of the Tokyo trials, was unanimously dis-
missed out of hand by the court (178).  
      State governments clearly have a legal 
right to prosecute alleged war criminals, in-
cluding POW abusers,8 and may combine their 
jurisdictions into a single court. These rights 
were exercised in the post-World War II trials.  
The manner in which those rights were used, 
however, left much to be desired regarding 
fairness.  The trials were conducted as military 
tribunals, even if they were of an international 
character, and therefore would probably not 
pass the requirements for a fair and independ-
ent court required by the ICCPR and the Ge-
neva Conventions.  The charters which estab-
lished the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
allowed them to ignore “technical rules of 
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 evidence” and admit anything they 
deemed to have relevance to the 
case in Articles 19 and 13, respec-
tively.9  The Tokyo Tribunal in particu-
lar suffered from a host of problems, 
including inter alia political and ethnic 
bias on the part of the judges, the dispro-
portionately high rejection rate of the de-
fense’s evidence, the abnormal length of the 
trial, and the relative lack of time and re-
sources available to the defense.  It did not 
come close to meeting fair trial standards, 
even at the time when it took place (Boister 
89-114).  Regardless of the importance of 
these trials to the development of modern 
international law, as a model for carrying out 
that law today they are sorely lacking. 
      The latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury has seen the increasing adoption of the 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which 
holds that certain crimes are so heinous that 
any court may charge, try and convict an 
offender regardless of the territorial limits of 
its jurisdiction.  War crimes, including grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, have 
fallen under universal jurisdiction since 
1945 (Shaw 595).  Article 7 of the Conven-
tion against Torture arguably gives states 
parties the authority to prosecute alleged tor-
turers even when they are not nationals and 
the alleged crimes are claimed to have oc-
curred outside the territory state in question.  
During the famous Pinochet extradition 
hearings, British judge Lord Millet even 
claimed that the prohibition of torture by 
custom afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction 
to national courts even without taking into 
account treaty law (599).  The application of 
this principle relies on alleged offenders be-
ing within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
state government that is willing to prosecute 
them, and some governments are more sup-
portive of the doctrine than others.  Belgium, 
for example, has made universal jurisdiction 
an explicit part of its national law. Several 
world leaders accused of crimes against hu-
manity have been charged by its courts, in-
cluding Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Paul 
Kagame, and Belgian courts have convicted 
several Rwandans of participating in geno-
cide (Macedo 3).  The United States govern-
ment, on the other hand, has been generally 
hostile toward the concept.  Some influential 
political and legal experts argue, not without 
some merit, that universal jurisdiction could 
be abused by state governments in order to 
threaten or punish foreign political oppo-
nents that would otherwise be protected by 
state sovereignty (6).  Many state govern-
ments will probably refuse to endorse uni-
versal jurisdiction because of such concerns, 
and so as a solution to the problem of pun-
ishing transgressors against international law 
the doctrine will be, by itself, inadequate. 
      In 2002 an institution was created 
that seeks, if not to solve, then at least to 
ameliorate some of the problems involved in 
enforcing international law by providing the 
services of a permanent and independent tri-
bunal, namely the International Criminal 
Court (hereafter ICC).  According to Article 
5 of the Rome Statute, the international legal 
instrument which created the ICC, it has ju-
risdiction over crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  Article 6 defines “crimes 
against humanity” to include torture, mur-
der, rape, and imprisonment in violation of 
international law, while Article 7 defines 
“war crimes” to include grave breaches of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions.   
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 Unfortunately, the United States 
has not ratified the Rome Statute, 
arguing that the independent prosecu-
tor may bring politicized charges 
against Americans who, since the 
United States is so heavily involved in 
world affairs, are more exposed than citi-
zens of other countries (Eleas 7).  Since 
2002 the U.S. government has actively op-
posed the ICC in a number of ways.  Con-
gress has passed an act that prevents federal 
agencies from cooperating with the ICC and 
prevents U.S. participation in peacekeeping 
missions where there is any danger that 
American personnel will be prosecuted by 
the ICC (11).  Therefore, it is unlikely be 
involved in the resolution of the issue of de-
tainees in the war against terrorism. 
7. Conclusion 
      Between the Geneva Conventions, 
their Additional Protocols, and the afore-
mentioned human rights treaties, there is no 
person, of any category, at any time, in any 
situation, anywhere in the world, during war 
or peace, who is not protected to some de-
gree by international law.  There can be no 
detainees or prisoners outside the law as far 
as the treaty obligations of the United States 
are concerned, regardless of their status as 
terrorists or criminals, and no matter 
whether they are held within or outside of 
U.S. territory. 
III. Violations Committed by the Bush 
Administration 
1. Introduction 
      Since the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, President Bush has authorized 
a series of military and intelligence opera-
tions known collectively as “the war against 
terrorism.”  In the course of this war mem-
bers of the United States military and intelli-
gence services have continuously, willfully, 
and systematically violated the rights of 
thousands of prisoners under both humani-
tarian law and human rights law, under the 
orders and condoning of top officials includ-
ing generals, members of the Cabinet, and 
the President.   
      American personnel have consis-
tently failed to perform adequate back-
ground checks needed to accurately deter-
mine whether detainees are POWs, crimi-
nals, or innocent civilians who were arrested 
by mistake or falsely implicated in military 
or terrorist activity.  The rights of habeas 
corpus and access to regularly established 
courts have been denied to prisoners in Iraq 
and Guantanamo Bay based on specious le-
gal reasoning, and hundreds of innocent peo-
ple have been detained for years before be-
ing released without charges.  Conditions in 
prisons run by Americans throughout the 
world have been inhumanely unhygienic and 
dangerous, sometime through neglect and 
sometimes as part of a deliberate plan to 
weaken the morale of prisoners prior to in-
terrogation.  Detainees have been subject to 
torture and inhuman, degrading treatment by 
Americans in the course of both interroga-
tions and disciplinary actions.  Some prison-
ers have also been subject to so-called 
“extraordinary renditions,” where they have 
been transported to other countries for the 
purpose of being interrogated and tortured 
by non-Americans.  In some cases American 
forces have extra-judicially killed prisoners 
or allowed them to be killed by allied forces.  
All of these actions are both morally outra-
geous and strictly prohibited by international 
law. 
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 2. Arrest without just cause  
a. Afghanistan 
     Even during the initial combat op-
erations in Afghanistan during 2001 
there were significant problems with the 
identification and processing of prisoners.  
A major element of these difficulties was 
the U.S.’s reliance on the Northern Alliance, 
a group of anti-Taliban militias.  The Alli-
ance provided the bulk of the ground troops 
during this period so that large numbers of 
American soldiers would not have to be 
committed, even though their forces had a 
history of brutality that rivaled their foes in 
the Taliban (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
5).  In the chaos and confusion of the war, a 
number of people were captured by Northern 
Alliance soldiers and then turned over to the 
Americans for interrogation who had very 
little or no connection at all with the Taliban 
or Al Qaeda, including travelers, relief 
workers, low-ranking foot soldiers, refugees, 
and religious teachers (30-38).   
     Pakistan was another nominal ally of the 
United States in the war against the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda. Pakistani soldiers and gov-
ernment officials proved themselves just as 
haphazard and careless in rounding up pris-
oners to be turned over to the United States 
as the Northern Alliance forces.  Thousands 
of refugees fled across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border during the course of the war, 
and Pakistani soldiers arrested hundreds of 
them, mainly foreigners, and turned them 
over to the Americans on extremely spurious 
grounds.  As with the prisoners captured by 
the Northern Alliance, there were few peo-
ple of any real intelligence value among 
these prisoners, only a diverse mix of foot 
soldiers, religious scholars, and civilian refu-
gees (49). 
     The unreliability of American allies to 
adequately screen prisoners was exacerbated 
by the United States’ own policy of offering 
bounties for alleged members of the Taliban 
and Al Qaeda.  Numerous prisoners have 
testified that they were falsely accused of 
working with or for terrorist groups and then 
“sold” to the Americans (46).  For example, 
one Saudi Arabian explained that he crossed 
into Pakistan and was denied access to the 
Saudi embassy by Pakistani soldiers until 
they handed him over to the United States in 
exchange for money (Sebaii 45-46).  There 
is also evidence that Afghani warlords from 
the Northern Alliance have earned money 
for transferring suspected terrorists and low-
ranking Taliban fighters into American cus-
tody (Raman). 
     American personnel also made their own 
blunders when it came to identifying and 
capturing suspected terrorists in Afghani-
stan, the most incomprehensible being the 
arrest of five political prisoners that had pre-
viously been held by the Taliban.  Because 
these men were foreigners, the Northern Al-
liance forced them to remain in prison even 
after the Taliban had been driven off, sup-
posedly for their own safety.  Even though 
they had been imprisoned by the Taliban for 
being suspected anti-fundamentalist spies, 
American agents later took them prisoner 
and sent them to the Guantanamo Bay 
Prison (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
114).  
     Given the chaotic nature of war in gen-
eral, the especially disorganized nature of 
Afghanistan, and the obvious risks that 
unlawful and unwarranted arrests would 
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 arise from offering these bounties, 
the United States should have been 
extremely careful in examining the 
backgrounds of prisoners and checking 
the stories of those who claimed inno-
cence.  In fact, American officials were 
incredibly lax in this regard, assuming as a 
matter of course that most or all of the de-
tainees in U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan 
were guilty of committing or conspiring to 
commit acts of terrorism.  The tribunals 
mandated by GC III to determine whether a 
belligerent belonged to a protected category 
of persons were completely absent at this 
point in time (90). Without any legally-
prescribed mechanisms for determining who 
belonged in prison, the United States has 
held hundreds of people prisoner without 
any legally justifiable reason for unaccepta-
bly long periods of time before discovering 
or deciding that they are not threats and sub-
sequently releasing them without charge.   
     An example of the stubborn refusal of 
United States government officials to con-
sider that a prisoner might not be a terrorist 
during this time is the case of Mohammed 
Sadiq.  He was a civilian who was over 80 
years old when he was arrested by American 
soldiers, apparently because one of his fam-
ily members was suspected of working for 
the Taliban. Even he, as obviously harmless 
as he was, spent several months under arrest 
before the United States released him 
(Raman).  Many others whose innocence 
could have been determined by a brief inves-
tigation immediately after their capture were 
held prisoner in Afghanistan and Cuba for 
years before being released without charge. 
There was, for example, Khalid al Morghi, 
the son of a senior Saudi Arabian military 
officer, who took a leave of absence from 
his white-collar job to perform charitable aid 
work in Afghanistan – hardly the portrait of 
a hardcore terrorist, or any sort of combatant 
at all.  He was still held, first in Afghanistan 
and later in Guantanamo Bay, for over four 
years before being released (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 54). 
     The “competent tribunals” required by 
GC III to determine the eligibility of prison-
ers for protection under humanitarian law 
did not appear until years after the war be-
gan, and even then they were too little, too 
late.  The Combatant Status Review Tribu-
nals that were announced in July 2004 suf-
fered from tremendous difficulties for a sev-
eral reasons.  First, the prisoners were de-
nied access to lawyers during the tribunals.  
Second, the court was allowed to hear secret 
evidence to which the prisoners had no ac-
cess.  Third, the tribunals were held far away 
from the battlefield and a long time after the 
persons in question had been captured, mak-
ing it very difficult for the defendants to call 
witnesses who might have known them to 
testify on their behalf. Finally, even when 
prisoners did provide addresses or telephone 
numbers for people that might have testified 
for them, the court apparently made no effort 
whatsoever to find them (267). 
     To sum up, the United States exhibited 
extreme negligence and willful disregard for 
international law in the way it processed al-
leged terrorists and criminals during the 
early part of the fighting in Afghanistan.  
The shocking thoughtlessness with which 
prisoners were initially assumed to be guilty 
and subsequently held in custody for months 
or years without an investigation was in di-
rect contravention of international  
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 humanitarian and human rights 
law10 and also offensive to common 
moral sensibilities.  The Bush admini-
stration and U.S. military and govern-
ment officials should have anticipated 
the possibility of wrongful arrests during 
a confusing and complicated war, but in-
stead displayed an attitude of unwarranted 
confidence that anyone under arrest must 
have done something to deserve it, an atti-
tude which it would carry into its handling 
of the long-term detention, trial procedures, 
and treatment of prisoners outside of Af-
ghanistan.  
b. Iraq 
     The Abu Ghraib prison facility was taken 
over by the United States in 2003, initially 
as part of the creation of a new Iraqi crimi-
nal justice system; most of the other prisons 
in the country had been ransacked beyond 
salvation by looters, and there were few 
other options available.  It was not intended, 
at first, to be used for detention operations 
by the American military (Gourevitch 19).   
     The increasing frequency of insurgent 
attacks in Baghdad caused American au-
thorities to change that policy.   Iraqis ar-
rested by American soldiers on patrol were 
put into Abu Ghraib because there was liter-
ally nowhere else for them to go, even 
though the prison’s location in a hostile area 
meant it came under mortar attack fre-
quently.  GC III provides that POW camps 
or other internment areas should not be lo-
cated in especially dangerous places, and the 
Red Cross determined that American per-
sonnel had not taken sufficient measures to 
offer protection from shelling to the prison-
ers (Greenberg 403).  Military prisoners and 
civilian prisoners were supposed to be han-
dled separately from each other, and offi-
cially there was an attempt to do that, with a 
temporary tent encampment meant specifi-
cally for the civilians.   However, the dis-
tinction between the two types of prisoners 
became less and less meaningful to the 
guards and administrators as the number of 
prisoners continued to increase beyond what 
they had been prepared to handle 
(Gourevitch 23).   
     Many prisoners were arrested on little 
evidence and were held long after they 
should have been released.  In 2003 Red 
Cross inspectors were told by intelligence 
officers that they believed well over half the 
prison population of Iraq was kept there mis-
takenly (Greenberg 388).  It was not uncom-
mon for American soldiers on patrol to ar-
rest anyone and everyone who was around 
during the aftermath of an attack.  Firing 
weapons in celebration was a fairly common 
practice in Iraq, and according to a member 
of the Justice Department’s Iraq rebuilding 
team, people were arrested for doing it 
(Gourevitch 23).  The biggest problem was 
that it was difficult for these people to get 
released from Abu Ghraib even after it was 
fairly apparent that they did not belong.  
Even when judges and lawyers arranged for 
a prisoner to be released, the military would 
sometimes prevent it from happening.  Some 
of the delays were probably just the result of 
bureaucratic errors, but the increasing de-
mand for useful intelligence about insur-
gents also started to contribute as well; often 
prisoners that would otherwise have been 
released were kept in the prison  because of 
supposed “intelligence value,” assessments 
that the top on-site civilian administrator put 
little stock in (24). 
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 The system of notification and in-
formation dissemination in Iraq was 
extremely flawed in 2003 as well.  It 
was rare for those making arrests to 
properly inform suspects or their fami-
lies of why they were being arrested or 
where they were taken, and the military 
usually failed to notify the families of sus-
pects detained while away from their homes 
that they had been arrested at all.  The 
ICRC, which otherwise would have helped 
notify families as quickly as possible, often 
received no or improperly completed paper-
work from the United States military, result-
ing in unnecessary delays (Greenberg 389). 
     Among all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, 
the ones that arguably least deserved to be 
there were the mentally ill ones, of which 
there may have been as many as ten.  Many 
were delusional or schizophrenic, engaging 
in violent and unhygienic behavior that was 
unsafe for other prisoners, the guards, and 
themselves.  These people should have been 
in a mental hospital instead of a military 
prison, or at least under the care of qualified 
mental health professionals.  There were 
none at Abu Ghraib, and even though many 
potentially helpful drugs were available at 
the facility, without doctors to prescribe 
them guards just gave the mentally ill pris-
oners Benadryl and tried to deal with their 
behavior as best as they could (Gourevitch 
145). 
     Many prisoners who were not obviously 
innocent civilians, including insurgents and 
some former members of Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraqi military, which had been officially dis-
banded after the capture of Baghdad, were 
held by the United States officially as non-
POWs because they were not members of a 
military force of a State Party to the Geneva 
Conventions.  According to one interrogator, 
a senior intelligence official reported that 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had told him 
that insurgents were not protected by the Ge-
neva Conventions and all interrogation tech-
niques were usable, including dogs (211).  
Rather, their detentions were justified as the 
necessary imprisonment of those suspected 
of spying, sabotage, or other hostilities.  Ar-
ticle 5 of GC IV does allow such detentions, 
but the ICRC has always held that its provi-
sions should only be applied to exceptional 
cases and on an individual basis (33).  Ap-
plying it to the detention of thousands of 
prisoners at the same time may, arguably, 
have been within the letter of the law, but it 
was most certainly in violation of its spirit.   
     The American soldiers in Baghdad can be 
excused for being aggressive with initial ar-
rests; however, that people with no apparent 
connection to insurgents or terrorists were 
kept imprisoned instead of released quickly 
is unacceptable.  Especially in a war zone 
with a shortage of space for prisoners, there 
seems little rationale for detaining more peo-
ple than absolutely necessary.  The same 
overly confident attitude from Afghanistan, 
the idea that anyone who was put in jail by 
an American must have done something 
wrong, was combined with the chaotic state 
of the country, its new justice system, and 
the American command structure to create a 
situation where many innocent civilians 
were put in prison for far longer than they 
should have been. 
3. Indefinite Detention and Unfair Trials 
     The prison at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, Cuba, has held over 750 prisoners 
since it opened in January 2002 (CBC).  
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 None of them had a fair trial or 
easy access to an impartial court 
while they were there, a situation that 
has famously been called a “legal black 
hole” (Steyn).  The legal basis for their 
imprisonment was President Bush’s Mili-
tary Order of November 13, 2001, which 
stated that any non-citizens of the United 
States could be detained, without any speci-
fied time limit, if the President believed they 
were involved in terrorism or if it was in the 
interests of the United States that they be 
detained (Greenberg 26).   
     The Bush administration chose Guan-
tanamo Bay as the location of the prison spe-
cifically to prevent the detainees from ever 
having access to an independent court in 
which they could challenge their detentions, 
complain about their treatment, or have a 
fair trial.  A memorandum submitted to the 
General Counsel of the Department of De-
fense on 28 December 2001, written by John 
Yoo and Patrick Philbin, who were both 
Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals at the 
time, demonstrates that quite clearly.  The 
memo argued that federal courts should not 
and probably would not find that they could 
exercise jurisdiction over an alien detained 
in Guantanamo Bay, and that chances were 
small that a judge would decide to grant a 
habeas corpus hearing in response to a peti-
tion filed by such a person (37).   
     Why was the administration so intent on 
preventing federal courts from having access 
to the detention camp?  Apparently, top offi-
cials had already decided that all of the pris-
oners were guilty, and they didn’t need or 
want any independent court to get involved 
and potentially challenge their decisions.  
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for 
example, stated publicly in January 2002 
that the Guantanamo prisoners were 
“committed terrorists,” and later that same 
month said that the prisoners were among 
the worst, most violent criminals in the 
world.  American generals gave statements 
to similar effect about the prisoners as well 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 127).  
These statements were being made about 
people who had never appeared in a court of 
law, much less been convicted in a fair trial.     
     The simplest solution to preventing the 
detainees from filing for habeas corpus or 
otherwise justifying their release would have 
been to classify them as prisoners of war, 
which Secretary of State Powell indeed ar-
gued should have been done (Greenberg 
123). However, for reasons which will be 
explained below, the administration decided 
to classify them as “unlawful combatants” in 
an attempt to prevent the Geneva Conven-
tions from applying to them (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 128).  The government 
was trying to have it both ways: locking up 
prisoners indefinitely and without putting 
them on trial as if they were POWs, but oth-
erwise behaving as if they were criminals. 
     The administration wasn’t entirely op-
posed to the idea of trials, but it wanted 
those trials on its terms and more or less un-
der its control.  The same Military Order that 
President Bush issued to justify the deten-
tion of suspected terrorists also provided for 
military tribunals to determine whether sus-
pected terrorists were guilty of war crimes, 
and that the danger to the United States 
posed by such persons necessitated that the 
rules of law and evidence in normal cases 
could not be applied.  According to the or-
der, appointments to said commissions 
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 would be made by the Secretary of 
Defense, and either he or the Presi-
dent could review and decide on the 
conviction or sentencing of a trial.  Fur-
thermore, any person subject to such a 
tribunal would be unable to appeal the 
decision in any American, foreign, or inter-
national court (Greenberg 25-28).  Because 
the judges would be military officers who 
take orders from the President they could 
never be truly independent of executive au-
thority (Koh “The Case Against Military 
Commissions” 339).  Military tribunals as 
prescribed by the President’s Military Order 
would almost certainly never meet the fair-
ness and independence requirements of ei-
ther the Geneva Conventions or the ICCPR. 
     One need not turn to hypothetical situa-
tions to see how unfair a trial by military 
commission would be, of course.  The first 
military trial of an “unlawful combatant” to 
be successfully concluded (in July 2008, 
more than six years after the Guantanamo 
prison opened) was the trial of Salim Ham-
dan, a man accused of working as a driver 
and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden.  (It 
was, in fact, because of his exclusion from 
parts of an earlier trial that the Supreme 
Court decided that military commissions 
violated the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld.)  The trial was riddled with 
problems, including the hearing of secret 
testimony behind closed doors, the accep-
tance of hearsay evidence of highly dubious 
validity, and the presentation of pointless, 
prejudicial evidence, supposedly meant to 
inform the jurors about the nature of Al 
Qaeda, but which served only as terrifying 
propaganda (Worthington “A critical over-
view”). 
     What’s worse, the court’s sentence seems 
to have no relationship with the reality of 
Hamdan’s detention.  A Pentagon spokes-
man has stated that even when Hamdan is 
finished serving his sentence,11  he may still 
be subject to potentially indefinite detention 
as an “enemy combatant”  (CNN).  This is 
nothing less than a mockery of justice and a 
demonstration of the paradoxical reasoning 
of the Bush administration.  Hamdan was 
deprived of prisoner of war rights for alleg-
edly violating the laws of war, but even after 
he has been convicted and punished accord-
ing to what passes for justice in Guan-
tanamo, the administration wants to hold 
him indefinitely as something other than a 
POW anyway.  This, at least as much as 
anything else, should prove that President 
Bush and his advisors did not care about jus-
tice or the rule of law, whether international 
or domestic, when it comes to the detainee 
victims of the war against terrorism. 
4. Torture 
a. Overview 
     Torture and activity degrading to human 
dignity have been used during the war on 
terror by the United States, at first, as inter-
rogation methods, in spite of the unequivo-
cal ban on such techniques by international 
law.  The use of such techniques was author-
ized at the highest levels of the civilian and 
military command structure (Greenberg 
360). 
b. Torture by American personnel 
i. Afghanistan 
     The use of torture and degrading treat-
ment began early on during military opera-
tions in Afghanistan, even before the official 
opening of any permanent prison sites.  No-
tably, in December 2001 John Walker 
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 Lindh, known colloquially in the 
U.S. media as “the American Tali-
ban,” was made to pose for humiliat-
ing photographs, threatened with death, 
taped to a stretcher while naked during 
interrogations, and denied medical treat-
ment for his injuries, including a bullet 
wound in his leg, for several days 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 82).    The 
office of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 
who was monitoring the interrogation 
closely, authorized the military interrogators 
in charge of Lindh to “take the gloves off” 
during the process (Roth and Worden 165).  
Another detainee who, like Lindh, immedi-
ately received extra attention from American 
soldiers and interrogators because of his race 
and nationality, was David Hicks, an Austra-
lian who fought for the Taliban.  Hicks has 
claimed in an official affidavit that shortly 
after he was handed over to American au-
thorities he had guns pointed at him and was 
threatened with death, and that later he was 
imprisoned onboard a naval ship where he 
was not given sufficient quantities of food.  
He also stated that he was transported to un-
known locations and forced to kneel in un-
comfortable positions for hours at a time 
while being struck by guards before being 
transported to the Kandahar prison (Bonner). 
     A permanent prison in Kandahar opened 
in January 2002, and for the first time a large 
number of prisoners were entered into the 
interrogation system.  At first the interroga-
tors tried to hew to the rules of behavior set 
by the Geneva Conventions and military 
regulations, but as the demand for useful 
intelligence increased they became more 
violent.  Many prisoners were physically 
beaten, restrained, had their fingers broken, 
or had hard objects thrown at their heads 
during interrogations.  Even these methods, 
brutal as they were, are relatively tame com-
pared to the most extreme techniques used 
by some interrogators outside the usual Mili-
tary Intelligence chain of command, includ-
ing Special Forces soldiers and agents of the 
CIA and FBI.  These extreme techniques 
included burning prisoners with scalding 
liquids and cigarettes, sexual violations, and 
application of electrical shocks.  Many pris-
oners asserted that these actions were often 
photographed and that those photographs 
were used in later interrogations to threaten 
prisoners (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
94-98).  
     The behavior of the prison guards was, if 
anything, even worse.  The relaxation of Ge-
neva Convention standards, combined with 
the general spirit of taking vengeance for the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, made the 
American guards especially prone to violent 
overreactions and arbitrary abuses.  Ameri-
can soldiers were told that their prisoners 
were “nobodies,” and at least one believed 
that if the Geneva Conventions had been ap-
plied and the prisoners labeled as “soldiers” 
then they would have been treated with more 
respect (Jehl).  Beatings were common re-
sponses to rule violations, and prisoners 
were often denied adequate amounts of sleep 
because of “inspections” during the night 
that forced them to stand outside in the cold.  
Even harsher exposure to extreme cold was 
not unheard of at Kandahar, either, as many 
prisoners stated that they were exposed to 
the cold while naked, and at least one had 
cold water thrown on his body during the 
night.  “Stress positions,” the binding of 
prisoners in a way meant to cause them 
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 physical pain, was also fairly com-
mon. 
     Psychological abuses also oc-
curred, often in tandem with the physi-
cal ones.  Prisoners were often forced to 
go naked while they were abused and 
were mocked and photographed in the proc-
ess.  Many had their beards, which are im-
portant to maintain for Muslims, shaved 
against their wills.  Although each detainee 
was given his own copy of the Koran, some 
guards damaged and desecrated the holy 
books in order to taunt them; yelling insult-
ing profanities about Islam and the Prophet 
Mohammed were fairly common as well 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 88). 
     The Kandahar facility was the main U.S.-
run prison in Afghanistan for only a few 
months, and in the spring of 2002 many de-
tainees were transferred from that location to 
the prison at Bagram Air Force Base, which 
has served as the central United States mili-
tary prison in the country ever since.  As a 
prison camp Bagram left much to be desired, 
with hastily thrown together cells and pens 
made from wood and barbed wire, and win-
dows boarded up with rusty sheets of iron 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 170). 
     The abuse from guards and interrogators 
did not improve during the transition from 
Kandahar, either.  Stress positions and sleep 
deprivation were incorporated into interroga-
tion routines as pressure to obtain intelli-
gence grew stronger.  Even the most well-
trained and ethical military interrogators 
went farther than they had before the move, 
keeping prisoners awake in long sessions for 
as long as the interrogators themselves could 
stay up, a process informally called 
“monstering.” The name reflected that these 
early interrogators considered it the worst, 
cruelest technique that they were willing to 
use.  When new, less experienced interroga-
tors were sent to work at Bagram they in-
creased the upper limit of sleep deprivation 
to 36 hours, ordered increased amounts of 
isolation and handcuffing outside of interro-
gation rooms, and generally allowed them-
selves to use other coercive techniques with 
greater frequency as time went by (Mackey 
471).  Unwarranted violence from the guards 
was as bad as it had ever been in Kandahar, 
if not worse, and the litany of beatings, hu-
miliations, religious insults, death threats, 
rapes, and electrical torture continued un-
abated (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
170). 
     The perhaps inevitable result of this cul-
ture of abuse was death; at least two Bagram 
inmates have died as a result of physical 
abuse from guards.  Both confirmed deaths 
were largely caused by reservists untrained 
in detention using powerful blows to the legs 
as disciplinary measures.  Mullah Habibul-
lah was shackled in a holding cell and struck 
in the legs repeatedly over several days be-
fore he succumbed to his injuries and died 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 188).  The 
second man, known only as Dilawar, was 
chained and beaten repeatedly for apparent 
non-compliance during an interrogation, and 
died after five days.  Official press releases 
ascribed the deaths only to heart attacks, but 
documentation from army doctors indicates 
that the damage to the legs was the most im-
portant factor (McCoy 126).  Two of the sol-
diers directly involved in the deaths were 
convicted of criminal abuse in 2005 and sen-
tenced to only a few months imprisonment; 
no officers were prosecuted at all (BBC 
  
 
    
     Great Day 2009                    SUNY Geneseo 
78 
21
Petracca: Mistreatment of Detainees in the War on Terror
Published by KnightScholar, 2010
 News). 
ii. Guantanamo Bay 
     During most of the first year of its 
existence, interrogations at the Guan-
tanamo Bay detention facility were 
fairly mild.  During this time mistreat-
ment involved general conditions, like open
-air cages for living quarters and insufficient 
amounts of food, an atmosphere of uncer-
tainty leading to intense fear, and large 
amounts of verbal abuse from the guards 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 132).  The 
worst, most violent transgressions were 
committed by the Extreme Reaction Force, 
or ERF, a squad of soldiers in riot gear who 
would respond to minor or nonexistent mis-
behavior with incredible savagery.  Tarak 
Dergoul, a Guantanamo detainee that was 
frequently targeted by the ERF because he 
organized prisoner strikes, was so trauma-
tized by his experiences that he needed psy-
chological counseling after his release 
(Rose). 
     Conditions in Guantanamo became much 
worse in October 2002 when, due to frustra-
tions from the lack of good intelligence, Ma-
jor General Geoffrey Miller was appointed 
as the new commander of the base. His 
predecessor was considered “soft” for allow-
ing detainees to keep their Korans and criti-
cizing guards for committing verbal abuse 
(Goldenberg).  It was Miller that decided 
that the best way to obtain results was to co-
ordinate the activities of the Military Police 
guards and the Military Intelligence interro-
gators - as he put it, to “set the conditions.”  
This meant that every aspect of the lives of 
the detainees was geared toward making 
them “break” under interrogation.  In prac-
tice, this meant more beatings of 
“uncooperative” prisoners by guards, includ-
ing, the continued use of the ERF teams, and 
the institution of new interrogation routines 
involving prolonged exposure to extreme 
temperatures and sleep deprivation 
(Worthington Guantanamo Files 193).  
     Miller’s appointment roughly coincided 
with high-level decisions to explicitly au-
thorize more violent forms of interrogation.  
In November 2002 Defense Secretary Rums-
feld responded positively to a request for 
new interrogation methods, explicitly allow-
ing such techniques as stress positions, sen-
sory and sleep deprivation, removing reli-
gious paraphernalia, the forced shaving of 
facial hair, and the use of dogs to frighten 
detainees.  Rumsfeld rescinded his authori-
zation several weeks later (Greenberg 237-
239).  According to an official log that was 
leaked to Time magazine, during that interim 
the harsh techniques were used against Mo-
hammed al-Qahtani, infamously known as 
the “twentieth hijacker” of the September 
11th attacks, including sleep deprivation and 
stress positions.  Additionally, female inter-
rogators would frequently invade his per-
sonal space in order to humiliate him.12  Re-
cently, the top legal military official in 
Guantanamo Bay has stated that she will not 
refer al-Qahtani to prosecution because the 
treatment he suffered amounts to torture 
(Woodward). 
     The administration was apparently 
pleased with the changes that General Miller 
had brought to Guantanamo Bay.  In Sep-
tember 2003, he was sent to Iraq in order to 
provide a similar overhaul to the interroga-
tion operations at the Abu Ghraib prison out-
side Baghdad, where the same practice of 
using the guards to constantly maintain an 
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 environment supposedly conducive 
to successful interrogations was in-
stituted and mentioned in the Army’s 
internal investigation of abuse 
(Goldenberg). 
iii. Iraq 
     An ICRC report released in 2004 and 
based on data gathered between February 
and November 2003 indicates that during 
that period in Iraq some level of brutality on 
the part of United States military personnel 
was present in every step of the detention 
process.  At the time of arrest soldiers would 
often threaten or strike suspects who had 
their hands cuffed behind their backs.  Dur-
ing transfers to prisons the treatment was 
even worse, as several severe beatings were 
reported, many resulting in serious injuries 
and a least one resulting in death.  At least 
two cases of major burns caused by forced 
contact with hot metal surfaces were also 
reported (Greenberg 390).  The very worst 
documented instances of mistreatment, 
which rose to the level of torture according 
to the Red Cross, occurred during interroga-
tions performed by members of the US 
Army’s Military Intelligence Corps. 
     The most common technique used by 
Military Intelligence (or MI) interrogators at 
Abu Ghraib was the solitary confinement of 
interrogation subjects in completely empty, 
totally dark rooms, for days at a time, while 
naked; cooperation with interrogators mer-
ited “rewards” such as beds, clothing, and 
light.  Other abusive methods observed by 
the Red Cross included sleep deprivation, 
binding of the hands in a manner that caused 
wrist wounds, and being forced to walk 
through the facility’s hallways while naked.  
The ICRC medical inspector discovered that 
several detainees had psychological prob-
lems, such as poor memory and suicidal ten-
dencies, which were judged to have resulted 
from the physical and mental stress of their 
interrogations (Greenberg 393). 
     Oddly enough, the report stated that the 
worst sorts of abuse mostly did not occur to 
detainees that were being held in regular 
prison facilities run by military police.  It 
noted that guards sometimes slapped or 
shoved detainees, and that one disciplinary 
measure used against detainees was forced 
exposure to the sun while handcuffed for as 
many as four hours, in addition to the more 
ordinary measures of temporary solitary 
confinement and withholding of cigarette 
rations (Greenberg 397).  That raises the 
question: Why was it that most of the sol-
diers charged and convicted with crimes in 
regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal were 
members of the Military Police Corps, and 
not MI personnel, when their behavior was 
relatively benign by comparison? 
     Part of the answer is that some MP 
guards were committing serious abuses that 
the ICRC apparently did not observe or col-
lect information about.  In accordance with 
General Miller’s transplanted Guantanamo 
policy the MPs took orders regarding pris-
oner treatment from interrogators, who con-
sisted mostly of MI personnel, but also 
anonymous officials thought to be working 
for the FBI or CIA, called OGA (for “other 
government agencies”) by the guards.  The 
MPs were responsible for maintaining the 
sleep deprivation of certain prisoners with 
yelling, door slamming, or loud music and 
taking away clothes from certain detainees 
and providing only women’s underwear for 
them to wear, in order to humiliate them.  
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 Often the MPs were instructed to 
“soften up” detainees prior to inter-
rogations; how exactly was left to 
their discretion, but the most common 
method was forcing them to exercise for 
several minutes   (Gourevitch 98).  This 
behavior had psychological repercussions, 
not only for the prisoners but for the guards 
as well.  One MP guard described how the 
process had numbed him to the point where 
he was no longer shocked or repulsed by 
what he was asked to do. Torturing prisoners 
at the behest of interrogators had become a 
normal experience for him (104).  Given the 
deleterious effects on the moral sensibilities 
of the MPs, it is not surprising that they dis-
played unwarranted violence towards prison-
ers on their own later.   
     The best-known image of abuse from 
Abu Ghraib is a photograph of a man wear-
ing a poncho and hood, standing on a box 
with wires attached to his hands.  On No-
vember 3rd, 2003, the MPs had been told that 
this prisoner was lying about his identity and 
were instructed to make him to confess his 
real name.  At first his treatment was typical 
- sleep deprivation, yelling, stress positions, 
forced exercise.  Then, inactive electrical 
wires were tied to his fingers, and the pris-
oner was told he would be electrocuted if he 
fell off of the box he was standing on (177).  
It looks bad, and it is bad, but for all of the 
photograph’s infamy it doesn’t come close 
to being the worst abuse at the prison, even 
by the Military Police. 
     The most egregious acts carried out by 
MPs on their own initiative and not at the 
behest of interrogators took place a few days 
later.  A group of seven prisoners thought to 
have instigated riots out in the tents were 
transferred to the MI cells, and for several 
hours before the guards brought them to 
their cells they were stripped naked, beaten 
about the hands, feet, face and chest, ver-
bally assaulted, forced to form a “pyramid” 
or “dog-pile” while being photographed, and 
put in positions simulating sex and mastur-
bation.  The MPs had never committed 
abuse on that scale before, and they never 
did again (196).  It was unusual enough that 
several guards felt the need to report the in-
cident to superior officers, but none of them 
seemed to make much of it (200). 
     Because of reports of prisoner abuse, lax 
discipline, and prisoner escapes at Abu 
Ghraib, an investigation was launched.  The 
result was an Army document referred to as 
the “Taguba Report” after the general in 
charge of the investigation.  The report 
found that abuse of prisoners by guards had 
occurred; in addition to the aforementioned 
examples, improper use of military dogs, 
threatening detainees with rape and death by 
gunshot, and pouring phosphoric substances 
from chemical lights onto detainees were 
also described in the report.  Of the thirteen 
people named as suspects, two were civilian 
contractors, one was an MI sergeant, and the 
rest were all members of the Military Police, 
none above the rank of Staff Sergeant 
(Greenberg 417).  General Taguba also 
found that the guards at Abu Ghraib had in-
sufficient training in detention operations 
and the rules of international humanitarian 
law, and that copies of the Geneva Conven-
tions were not provided in sufficient num-
bers to American personnel or the prisoners, 
and that prison commander General Karpin-
ski had done too little to disseminate infor-
mation and prevent abuse.  He  
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 recommended an overhaul of oper-
ating procedures, training in deten-
tion and the laws of war for all per-
sonnel involved with prisons, and an 
inquiry into MI interrogators regarding 
their role in prison abuse (420).        
     When the shocking photographs of the 
abuse at Abu Ghraib taken by soldiers were 
leaked to the press and shown on national 
television some sort of action was necessary.  
Several Military Police and a few Military 
Intelligence soldiers were court-martialed 
and convicted of crimes such as assault, con-
spiracy, or dereliction of duty.  Only one 
commissioned officer, who was found inno-
cent, was court-martialed.  A few others 
faced fines and administrative reprimands, 
and Brigadier General Karpinski was de-
moted one rank and relieved of her com-
mand.  No one was charged with torture or 
war crimes.  No OGA or civilian interroga-
tors were ever brought to trial.  Brigadier 
General Jane Karpinski, the MP commander, 
was demoted one rank.  General Miller was 
never brought to account for his recommen-
dations, and senior officials were not held 
responsible for allowing the situation to de-
teriorate to such a level in the first place 
(270).  Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, 
who had authorized the use of extreme psy-
chological torture techniques that had been 
developed by the CIA without telling the 
MP commander or officers, faced no official 
consequences either (McCoy 134).  What 
the guards did in Abu Ghraib was wrong, 
and they should have been punished for it; 
using orders from a superior as a justifica-
tion for war crimes has been a non-starter 
since the Nuremberg trials.  However, that 
doesn’t mean that those who gave the orders, 
and those who created conditions where 
such orders could conceivable be given and 
carried out, do not bear any responsibility 
either. 
iv. Secret prisons 
     In addition to the major prisons in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Cuba, smaller prisons offi-
cially known as “black sites” that were oper-
ated by the Central Intelligence Agency ex-
isted in those countries and other places 
throughout the world, including Thailand 
and Eastern Europe.  These black sites were 
used for the purpose of detaining and inter-
rogating prisoners thought to possess espe-
cially important information about Al Qaeda 
or other terrorist organizations without any 
official oversight or acknowledgment of 
their existence.  The so-called “ghost” pris-
oners were held secretly, without access to 
lawyers, agents of the press, or representa-
tives of the Red Cross, and their CIA inter-
rogators were allowed to subject them to the 
same types of degrading and torturous meth-
ods that had been used in Abu Ghraib and 
Guantanamo (Priest “CIA Holds Terror Sus-
pects”).   
     Several “enhanced” interrogation tech-
niques were also officially authorized for use 
at the black sites in addition to what was 
standard elsewhere, including a severe form 
of stress positions that could be used on a 
prisoner for over forty hours at a time, con-
stantly dousing naked prisoners with cold 
water while locked in a cold cell, severe 
sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation and 
bombardment and, most infamously, water-
boarding.  This latter method involves bind-
ing a prisoner, covering his mouth, and 
pouring water onto his face in order to cause 
the same physiological and mental  
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 sensations as drowning.  These 
procedures were used against about 
a dozen prisoners believed to be sen-
ior members of Al Qaeda who pos-
sessed important information, including 
Khalid Sheik Mohammed (or “KSM”), 
who is regarded as the primary planner of 
the September 11th attacks (Ross).  Water-
boarding was used on three of these prison-
ers; KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd al-
Rahim al-Nashiri (Bradbury “Re: Applica-
tion of United States Obligations Under Ar-
ticle 16 of the Convention Against Torture” 
6).  Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in 
August 2002, and KSM suffered it 183 times 
in March 2003, averaging out to approxi-
mately 3 and 6 waterboarding sessions per 
day, respectively (37). 
     The other ghost prisoners, while not sub-
jected to the most extreme “enhanced” tech-
niques, still suffered a great deal, especially 
the ones being held in the black sites of Af-
ghanistan.  Several prisoners who have been 
released from the secret prisons in that coun-
try reported multiple forms of torture and 
abuse, including sleep deprivation, starva-
tion, and exposure to extreme cold weather.  
One unidentified inmate of a secret prison in 
Afghanistan that was codenamed the “Salt 
Pit” had his clothing removed on the orders 
of a CIA interrogator and subsequently died 
of hypothermia in his cell during the night 
(Priest “CIA Avoids Scrutiny”). 
     The black sites represent the very worst 
excesses of the Bush Administration’s de-
tainee policy.  The level of torture, the se-
crecy and lack of accountability, and the to-
tal subversion of due process and interna-
tional law went beyond even the Guan-
tanamo Bay camp.  Fortunately, much like 
Guantanamo the black sites were ordered 
closed by an executive order of President 
Obama shortly after his inauguration.  Un-
fortunately, the fact that these senior Al 
Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed, underwent waterboarding and 
other forms of torture and degrading treat-
ment will immensely complicate their future 
trials. 
c. Extraordinary renditions 
     The term “extraordinary rendition” refers 
to the practice of secretly transporting a pris-
oner to another country, generally the same 
one where the prisoner in question was born, 
and giving him into the custody of that 
country’s security forces in order to be inter-
rogated and potentially prosecuted.  In itself 
the idea is not necessarily illegal, but since 
2001 the Bush administration has turned 
over many prisoners to foreign countries 
when there has been a high probability, or 
even an expectation, that they would be tor-
tured while in their custody, contravening 
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 
     Renditions were practiced on a limited 
basis during the 1990s, exclusively for indi-
viduals with standing arrest warrants or in 
absentia convictions in foreign countries 
(usually Egypt), with safeguards to protect 
innocent people from rendition and some 
sort of assurance that torture would not take 
place, although even back then those assur-
ances were generally not worth much 
(Mayer).  As bad as the program was in the 
1990s, the flaws of the rendition program 
were magnified as its use was expanded af-
ter September 2001. 
     Under the Bush administration the CIA 
has renditioned several people only sus-
pected of terrorism, and in many cases the 
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 evidence connecting these persons 
with terrorist organizations was very 
weak.  For example, Maher Arar is a 
Canadian citizen who was born in 
Syria. He was arrested in an airport be-
cause he knew (vaguely) another man 
suspected of terrorism.  On that flimsy basis 
Arar was transported to Syria, where he was 
held for a year and tortured by security per-
sonnel before being released without 
charges; the Syrians had apparently not 
found any connection between him and any 
terrorist organization in that time (Mayer).   
     In addition to Egypt and Syria, prisoners 
were also renditioned to other countries 
where torture and prisoner abuse are known 
to be fairly common, including Uzbekistan 
and (to a lesser extent) Jordan.  CIA officials 
not only suspected that these countries were 
torturing the prisoners that they were receiv-
ing from the United States but expected it; 
the senior CIA operative in the Uzbek capi-
tal told the British ambassador that he knew 
that the Uzbek government was torturing 
prisoners for information (Grey).  At least 
one man was transported from Pakistan to 
Morocco expressly because the Moroccans 
were willing to use methods that the Paki-
stanis weren’t, including the infliction of 
small cuts all over the body over a long pe-
riod of time (Worthington Guantanamo Files 
230).  
     It is impossible to imagine that the threat 
of prisoners being tortured once sent into the 
custody of these countries is not substantial 
enough to qualify for Article 3 of the Con-
vention against Torture.  In carrying out ex-
traordinary renditions government agents not 
only neglected their responsibilities under 
the Convention against Torture but actively 
sought to violate its requirements. 
IV. Legal Justifications 
     Members of the Bush administration 
have presented a number of legal arguments, 
both internally and externally, which justify 
or excuse the abusive treatment of detainees 
suspected of involvement in terrorist activi-
ties and direct responsibility for committing 
the most unpalatable abuses away from top 
officials.  These arguments are severely 
lacking in a number of respects, although not 
to the point of being frivolous.  It is there-
fore necessary to examine them in some de-
tail in order to present thorough counterargu-
ments. 
1. Inapplicability of International Law 
     Starting in the early years of the war on 
terrorism, several legal advisors within the 
White House advanced arguments to the ef-
fect that the Geneva Conventions could be 
interpreted to not apply to prisoners sus-
pected of terrorist activity.  They also as-
serted that other elements of international 
humanitarian and human rights law could 
not restrict the decisions of the President re-
garding the matter of detainees who posed a 
potential security threat to the United States. 
     Deputy Assistant John Yoo drafted a 
memorandum for the United States Depart-
ment of Defense in January 2002 that put 
forth three reasons why members of Al 
Qaeda would not be protected by the Geneva 
Conventions if they were captured in Af-
ghanistan: Al Qaeda is not a State Party to 
the Geneva Conventions; the war in Af-
ghanistan is neither a war between states nor 
a civil war, and therefore is not under the 
purview of the Conventions; and Al Qaeda 
members do not obey the laws of war as 
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 required by GC III Article 4(a)(2), 
such as carrying arms openly and 
wearing uniforms or visible symbols 
to distinguish themselves from civilians  
(Greenberg 49).   
     This memo also argued that members 
of the Taliban would not need to be af-
forded protections under the Conventions 
even though Afghanistan is a State Party be-
cause Afghanistan was a failed state while 
the Taliban controlled it, and because the 
Taliban was connected so closely with Al 
Qaeda that the two organizations could not 
be legally distinguished from each other 
(50).  Even if international humanitarian law 
applied in Afghanistan, the memo argued, 
Taliban members would still not be pro-
tected by GC III because of their failure to 
meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements, and 
that competent tribunals required by Article 
5 would be unnecessary if the President de-
termined that all Taliban members failed to 
meet those requirements, thus supposedly 
removing “doubt” as to their legal status and 
obviating the need for the tribunals to elimi-
nate it (110).  It stated that even if the sub-
stance of the Geneva Conventions or other 
instruments of international humanitarian 
law were a part of customary international 
law, it would not matter because customary 
law is not the federal law of the United 
States and therefore is incapable of binding 
the powers of the President (112).   
     Shortly after receiving the memorandum 
described above, Alberto Gonzales sent his 
own memo to President Bush, advising him 
of the positive and negative ramifications of 
disregarding the Geneva Conventions in the 
Afghanistan war.13  In his arguments against 
the likelihood of the negative outcomes hap-
pening, Gonzales asserted that the Bush’s 
official orders to treat prisoners “humanely” 
would prevent severe backlashes from other 
countries and the undermining of American 
military culture (119-121).  On 7 February 
2002, President Bush gave orders to the ef-
fect that GC III did not apply to Al Qaeda 
and that all Taliban detainees were to be 
considered unlawful combatants instead of 
POWs, but that they should be treated hu-
manely anyway “[a]s a matter of policy” but 
not a matter of law (135). 
     An internal report on detainee interroga-
tion was largely informed by these Justice 
Department opinions, and also asserted that 
the United States has held that the ICCPR 
does not apply to international military op-
erations (243). 
2. Redefining Torture 
     Lawyers working in the Bush administra-
tion advanced extremely restrictive munici-
pal and international legal definitions of the 
word “torture” in a pair of controversial 
memos, both of which were dated 1 August 
2002 and were sent to Alberto Gonzales.  
The first, written by Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Jay Bybee of the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, concerned the application of domestic 
legal prohibitions of torture.  The second, by 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General John 
Yoo, was about international law and what it 
would allow in interrogations of Al Qaeda 
members. 
 The Bybee memo referred to the 
definition of torture that is found in the 
United States Code Section 2340, the opera-
tive words being “severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering.”  It attempted to refine that 
definition further, by showing that the 
phrase “severe pain” as used in other 
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 American statutes meant an indica-
tor of dangerous and permanent 
physical damage.  Bybee argued that 
this phrase meant the same thing in the 
legal definition of torture, and that 
therefore pain 
…must rise to a similarly high level - 
the level that would ordinarily be 
associated with a sufficiently serious 
physical condition or injury such as 
death, organ failure, or serious im-
pairment of body functions – in order 
to constitute torture. (Greenberg 176) 
          Section 2340 further defines “severe 
mental pain of suffering” as “prolonged 
mental harm” caused by certain intentional 
acts, such as the infliction of pain, admini-
stration of drugs, or threats to do the same.  
Bybee focused on the word “prolonged” in 
interpreting the statute, arguing that the 
strain from long interrogation would proba-
bly not qualify, whereas actions resulting in 
post-traumatic stress disorder or depression 
possibly could.  The memo also argued that 
any potential defendant must have intended 
to cause this prolonged mental harm in order 
to be guilty under the terms of Section 2340; 
if he acted with some other purpose in good 
faith with the belief that his actions would 
not result in that kind of mental damage, that 
should provide a sufficient defense against 
prosecution regardless of the actual outcome 
of his actions, according to this argument 
(178). 
     Regarding cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, the memo notes that the Conven-
tion against Torture calls only for state par-
ties to “prevent” such acts from being car-
ried out in areas under their jurisdiction.  
This is interpreted to mean that the CAT 
does not require such acts to be criminalized, 
further demonstrating that “torture” is at the 
farthest, most extreme end of the spectrum 
of methods of inflicting pain (185). 
     Ultimately, the Bybee memo concluded 
that the word “torture” legally referred to 
only the most extreme actions of inflicting 
physical and mental pain, and that there 
were many acts which would be cruel and 
degrading without actually being on the 
same level as torture (214). 
     The John Yoo memo noted that when the 
United States acceded to the Convention 
against Torture, the administration of the 
first President Bush included a reservation to 
the treaty to the effect that it understood 
“torture” as relating to the Convention to 
have the same definition as found in Section 
2340, and that it was ratified with this mean-
ing in mind.  Because treaties cannot affect a 
state without its consent, the memo argued, 
it is by this definition of torture that the 
United States is bound by the CAT (220).  
Taken together with the Bybee memo sent to 
Alberto Gonzales on the same day, this 
means that the same very narrow and ex-
treme definition of what constitutes torture 
also applies to the treaty obligations of the 
United States under the CAT. 
     Additionally, legal opinions regarding the 
legality of specific interrogation methods 
were also issued by the Justice Department.  
One was sent to the CIA’s General Counsel 
by Jay Bybee on 1 August 2002, the same 
day the memos regarding the general defini-
tion of torture were officially transmitted.  
This memo regarded techniques the CIA 
wanted to use in the interrogation of sus-
pected Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, in-
cluding forced standing, stress positions, 
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 physical blows, sleep deprivation, 
and waterboarding (Bybee 2).  It 
ultimately concluded that all of the 
techniques failed to qualify as “torture” 
under the international legal obligations 
of the United States (18).  Another memo 
concerning techniques that could be used 
on “a High Value al Qaeda Detainee” during 
CIA interrogations was issued in May 2005, 
covering a greater number of methods 
(including force nudity and dousing with 
cold water) that still encompassed stress po-
sitions and waterboarding (Bradbury “Re: 
Application of 18 U.S.C. 18 § § 2340-
2340A” 7-13).  As with the previous memo, 
the conclusions was that all the techniques 
were legal so long as they were monitored to 
prevent serious threats to the safety of the 
detainees (45). 
3. Shifting responsibility down the chain of 
command 
     The scandal regarding the treatment of 
prisoners at Abu Ghraib required, to a much 
greater extent than any other aspect of the 
Bush administration’s detainee policy, a 
public response and the punishment of the 
parties responsible.  At first the entirety of 
the blame was laid squarely at the feet of the 
individual soldiers who had personally com-
mitted the abuses seen in the publicly avail-
able photographs.  Later on, public reports 
and investigations forced some top officials 
to take some responsibility, at least verbally; 
as noted above, no one higher-ranking than a 
non-commissioned officer was ever con-
victed in a court of law for the Abu Ghraib 
abuses, and no one at the White House or the 
Pentagon was fired or forced to resign im-
mediately. 
     In May 2004, shortly after the photo-
graphs of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib 
were shown to the public, both Defense Sec-
retary Rumsfeld and President Bush at-
tempted to limit the blame to the relatively 
few American personnel seen in them.  In a 
press briefing, Rumsfeld decried the actions 
of those people and referred to their actions 
as “exceptional and isolated” (DefenseLink).  
Rumsfeld stated that he took responsibility 
for what had happened in Abu Ghraib during 
Congressional hearings a few days later, but 
considering that he did not resign and was 
not investigated his words seem to have little 
meaning (Shanker). 
     President Bush went on Arab television 
in early May to claim that he was appalled 
by the scandal, that it would be thoroughly 
investigated, and that all responsible would 
be brought to justice (Stevenson).  On 24 
May Bush called the abuses the actions of “a 
few” soldiers in an address that was tele-
vised in the United States (Roth and Worden 
146). 
     The investigations which followed were 
damning to upper-level military and civilian 
leaders, but not to the point where any sort 
of punishment was recommended or imple-
mented.  One panel, which was led by for-
mer Defense Secretary James Schlesinger 
and appointed by Rumsfeld to investigate 
the scandal, released a report in August 2004 
which blamed failures of leadership on the 
part of top officials at Central Command and 
the Pentagon for creating a climate and cul-
ture that was conducive to allowing abuses.  
It also accused them of having missed sev-
eral warning signs about what was happen-
ing at Abu Ghraib.  However, it also held 
that the scenes in the photographs were not 
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 the result of direct orders and were 
merely excesses of the prison “night 
shift” out of control.  Critically, the 
panel did not recommend that Secretary 
Rumsfeld or any other senior civilian or 
military leader resign or face some other 
punishment (Watson).   Other internal mili-
tary investigations came to similar conclu-
sions; that general policy errors had contrib-
uted to what had happened in Abu Ghraib, 
but that top policy makers should not be 
held accountable the way the actual guards 
were.  In spite of the involvement of Central 
Intelligence Agency interrogators at Abu 
Ghraib and their actions toward detainees 
there, no one recommended investigating 
CIA leaders (Roth and Worden 153). 
V. Refuting the Bush administration’s ar-
guments 
1. Why international law is applicable 
a. Reasons why Geneva should be applied to 
Afghanistan 
     The argument that Afghanistan was a 
failed state, that the Taliban was therefore 
not its legitimate government, and that it 
therefore was not a State Party to the Geneva 
Conventions, might have been valid had it 
been consistent with the practice of the 
United States and other countries.  In fact, 
however, although the Taliban had not been 
recognized as the de jure leaders of Afghani-
stan the international community, including 
the United States, had treated it as having 
obligations under Afghanistan’s treaties, in-
cluding the Geneva Conventions, as then 
Secretary of State Powell stated in a memo 
to Alberto Gonzales advocating the applica-
tion of international humanitarian law in Af-
ghanistan (Greenberg 124).  In fact, the term 
“failed state” carries no weight in interna-
tional law, and Afghanistan’s legal rights 
remained intact even through years of divi-
sive warfare (de Nevers 385).  The decision 
to treat Afghanistan as a failed state unable 
to live up to its treaty obligations was there-
fore not a reasoned decision based on the 
facts, but rather a loophole that the admini-
stration tried to use in order to carry out its 
favored detention policies with less resis-
tance from the international community. 
     Legal advisers from the Department of 
State agreed with Powell that the Geneva 
Conventions should have been applied in 
Afghanistan.  The United States had always 
recognized them whenever it brought its 
forces into conflicts in the past, which was a 
legacy the DOS was reluctant to break with.  
The UN Security Council had called on all 
parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to ad-
here to humanitarian law in a resolution 
from 1998, and not recognizing the applica-
tion of those laws would be inconsistent on 
the part of the United States. Furthermore, 
the DOS legal department held that it would 
not be possible to apply the Conventions to 
the Taliban but not to Al Qaeda; either eve-
ryone involved in the Afghanistan conflict 
was protected by law, or none of them were 
(Greenberg 129).   
     Other individuals and organizations, in-
cluding the ICRC and the Secretary General 
of the United Nations, have also criticized 
the rationale for not applying the Geneva 
Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan.  
They have argued that any prisoner must 
automatically be treated as a POW unless 
and until a court removes any doubt that he 
or she does not qualify for such protections.  
These critics have also argued that Taliban 
soldiers qualify as members of military 
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 forces loyal to “an authority not 
recognized by a the Detaining 
Power” as described under Article 4
(a)(3) of GC III.  Such fighters would 
thus need to be treated as prisoners-of-
war regardless of their obedience to the 
laws and customs of war as described in 4
(a)(2) (Greenberg 587). 
b. Need for competent tribunals 
     The legal argument that the President of 
the United States can decide that all mem-
bers of a fighting militia fail to meet the re-
quirements of GC III Article 4 (2) is weak 
for a number of reasons.  It ignores the pos-
sibility, however remote, that any units or 
individual members of that militia might 
meet the requirements for prisoner of war 
status in spite of general trends within the 
organization towards noncompliance.  Also, 
giving the executive branch the power to 
unilaterally decide that thousands of fighters 
are, essentially, in violation of the laws and 
customs of war, circumvents traditional stan-
dards of due process for accusations of 
criminal behavior.  Classifying thousands of 
people as criminals, or even alleged crimi-
nals, without the involvement of a single 
impartial judge violates the need for fairness 
in legal proceedings required by interna-
tional humanitarian and human rights law; 
an independent court is needed to ensure that 
justice is carried out correctly, even when 
dealing with potential war criminals cap-
tured on the battlefield.  
     Even accepting for the sake of argument 
that every single member of an armed militia 
can be classified as a war criminal at once, 
the need for tribunals to hear the cases of 
captured prisoners would still not be elimi-
nated.  Even without legal doubt that any 
member of a certain organization fails to 
meet the legal standards required by GC III, 
doubt may still remain whether a given indi-
vidual is, in fact, a member of said organiza-
tion.  It has been shown that civilians were 
arrested by United States military and intelli-
gence personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
under the mistaken assumption that they 
were members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, 
and that many of them were imprisoned ei-
ther in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay for 
months or years afterward.  These errors 
would almost certainly have been reduced in 
frequency and duration if tribunals had ex-
isted to swiftly review the cases of detainees 
claiming to have been wrongly arrested.  
c. AP I Minimum Standards 
     The First Additional Protocol to the Ge-
neva Conventions has not been ratified by 
the United States; however, Article 75, 
which guarantees certain rights for prisoners 
involved in armed conflicts regardless of 
their status, is widely regarded as having 
entered or become customary international 
law regarding this matter (Sands 150).  John 
Yoo dismissed the importance of customary 
international law in his January 2002 memo, 
however, thereby attempting to negate AP I 
and other elements of the Geneva Conven-
tions that may have entered into custom.   
     It is true that customary law is not ap-
proved by the United States Congress; how-
ever, that does not mean that it should be 
ignored so flippantly.  That would overlook 
the historical and continued importance of 
custom to the development of international 
and domestic law throughout the world.  De-
claring that it has no power and can be 
safely ignored is disingenuous and self-
serving.  Moreover, it overlooks the fact 
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 that United States courts have ac-
cepted the validity of customary in-
ternational law regarding torture and 
degrading treatment (Greenberg 600), 
d. Human Rights Treaties 
     The prohibitions against torture in the 
ICCPR and the Convention against Torture 
apply wherever the States Party to them 
have jurisdiction.  The CAT specifically re-
quires its prohibitions against torture and 
degrading treatment to be a part of the rules 
and duties of any government officials of a 
State Party involved in the detention or in-
terrogation of prisoners anywhere in the 
world.  The UN Committee against Torture 
has found that several methods used by 
American interrogators constitute torture or 
degrading treatment under the terms of the 
CAT, including frequent beating, excessive 
binding of limbs, exposure to low tempera-
tures, long periods of sleep deprivation, and 
sensory bombardment (Greenberg 568).  
More specifically, the Committee against 
Torture found that the patterns of physical 
abuse and indefinite detention of prisoners at 
Guantanamo Bay violated the Convention 
and called on the United States to close the 
prison (McCoy 219). 
     The prohibitions against torture and de-
grading treatment found in Article 7 of the 
ICCPR are absolute and do not countenance 
any exceptions for national security or any 
other purpose.  The Human Rights Commit-
tee has found in the past that methods in-
cluding sleep deprivation, hooding, and oth-
ers that have been used by American forces 
violate Article 7 regardless of how or why 
they are used (Greenberg 592), 
2. Why some techniques used by the U.S. are 
torture 
     Jay Bybee’s August 2002 memo went 
very far in asserting that the term “torture” 
could be legally applied only to an ex-
tremely narrow set of practices and that 
forms of interrogation that might be consid-
ered objectionable were legal under domes-
tic and international law.  The memo was 
fought by certain Justice Department law-
yers, generated a powerful backlash from 
legal experts after it became publicly avail-
able, and was also inconsistent with the 
practices of the United States regarding in-
terrogation methods in foreign countries.  
It’s definition of “torture” has been rejected, 
and many lawyers, politicians, and NGOs 
have since applied that word to American 
practices. 
a. Legal arguments  
     After its public release the arguments of 
the Bybee memo were roundly criticized by 
legal experts.  For example, in testimony 
given before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in January 2005, the Dean of Yale Law 
School Harold Koh called the opinion 
“clearly erroneous.”  He stated that the nar-
row definition of “torture” contained within 
it contradicted the ordinary and commonly 
understood meaning of the word, and that it 
would exclude many of the heinous actions 
carried out by Saddam Hussein’s security 
forces.  Dean Koh also argued that the 
memo’s interpretation of the Convention 
Against Torture to legally permit the use of 
cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment 
risked giving officials working for the ex-
ecutive branch license to abuse people in 
their custody. 
     Even lawyers who were working at the 
Justice Department objected to the reasoning 
of the Bybee memo.  Jack Goldsmith, who 
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 became the head of the Office of 
Legal Counsel in October 2003, de-
cided that this torture and interroga-
tion policy was legally problematic 
shortly afterward.  He worked with 
other OLC lawyers to have that policy 
overturned and the opinion withdrawn – 
which had almost never happened over the 
course of a single administration before – 
until he resigned in July 2004 (Klaidman).  
The OLC prepared a new opinion to replace 
the Bybee memo which was officially re-
leased in December 2004; this new opinion 
contained less restrictive definitions of 
“torture” and “physical and mental suffer-
ing” (Levin). 
b. U.S. government practices 
     The Department of State issues an annual 
report on the state of human rights practices 
in every other country throughout the world.  
It is generally written without undue partisan 
political input, and the 2003 report con-
demned as torture the use of interrogation 
methods in foreign countries. Unfortunately, 
the United States itself had been using these 
techniques against suspected terrorists held 
in its custody. 
     The types of techniques used by the 
United States which the State Department 
criticized foreign countries for using include, 
but are not limited to, stress positions, expo-
sure to extreme temperatures, sleep depriva-
tion, and waterboarding (Roth and Worden 
143).  Now, it would certainly be possible to 
make a serious argument that some of those 
methods are not, depending on how they are 
used, severe enough to constitute torture; the 
State Department isn’t an absolute authority 
on such things, after all.  However, that the 
DOS was willing to criticize these methods 
so strongly in an official, publicly available 
document means that these methods are le-
gally and morally objectionable, at least to 
the point where they rise to the level of 
cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment.  
Even saying for the sake of argument that 
the State Department is in the wrong and 
that some of the above techniques do not rise 
to the level of torture does not make them 
acceptable.  The use of such techniques by 
anyone, regardless of their exact legal classi-
fications, should never be tolerated. 
c. Severity of techniques 
     There are, on the other hand, certain in-
terrogation methods which unquestionably 
constitute torture according to the plain 
meaning of the world, the definition found 
in the ICCPR and the Convention against 
Torture, and even by the unreasonably se-
vere definitions of the Bybee memo.  Inter-
national human rights organizations have 
unequivocally denounced them, and their 
victims have been left with permanent physi-
cal injuries and disabilities, as well as dan-
gerous and long-lasting mental illnesses as a 
result of their treatment. 
     Several prisoners held at Guantanamo 
were driven to suicidal behavior by the con-
ditions of fear, uncertainty, and constant 
abuse at the prison camp.  During the first 
eighteen months of the camp’s operation 
there were twenty-eight officially recognized 
suicide attempts and over three hundred in-
stances of prisoners acting in a self-abusive 
manner.  A mass suicide attempt in 2003 
involving twenty-three prisoners led to only 
two attempts being officially reported, while 
the others were classified as merely “self-
injurious.” It seems that the use of that clas-
sification in Guantanamo should be 
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 with some suspicion (Worthington 
Guantanamo Files 271).  Less se-
vere instances of mental illness have 
also been disproportionately common 
among the Guantanamo prisoners, as a 
group of British citizens released in 2004 
reported that a fifth of the prisoners were 
taking anti-depressant medications and ap-
proximately a hundred had other clearly visi-
ble forms of mental illness (280). 
     Interrogations and abuse by American 
personnel in Iraq have also been known to 
cause severe mental and physical harm. Red 
Cross doctors that were part of the delega-
tion visiting Abu Ghraib concluded that cer-
tain prisoners they interviewed at the prison 
displayed signs of mental illness including 
memory loss, anxiety, problems speaking or 
the inability to speak, and suicidal tenden-
cies as a result of their interrogations by MI 
personnel (Greenberg 393).  Official United 
States military documents that had been sup-
pressed but later released also revealed that 
several Iraqi prisoners died while in custody 
at Abu Ghraib and secret CIA facilities; a 
dozen of these deaths were ruled either 
homicides or “unexplained” on death certifi-
cates. For example, an Iraqi air force general 
who surrendered to American troops in No-
vember 2003 died several days later as a re-
sult of beatings from CIA and MI interroga-
tors at a makeshift facility in the desert 
(McCoy 144). 
     The “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
used by the CIA at its secret locations have 
come under particularly harsh criticism by 
humanitarian organizations throughout the 
world, as most of them clearly constitute 
torture or extremely cruel and degrading 
treatment.  A leaked internal document from 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, for example, labeled these techniques 
“torture” based on interviews with prisoners 
who had experienced them.  Many prisoners 
reported that stress positions and forced 
standing were the most physically painful 
methods (Shane, “Book Cites Secret Red 
Cross Report”).  Severe sleep deprivation 
also qualifies as one of the approved 
“enhanced” methods that unquestionably 
qualifies as torture; the late Menachim Be-
gin, who experienced such methods while he 
lived in the Soviet Union, even wrote that 
the desire for uninterrupted sleep can feel 
even worse than hunger or thirst (Conroy 
34). 
     One method that has been the particular 
focus of controversy and debate is 
“waterboarding,” the “enhanced technique” 
that has been used on the smallest number of 
prisoners and arguably the most severe.  
“Waterboarding” can refer to variety of 
means for cutting off the victim’s air supply 
with water, all of which produce physical 
and mental sensations similar to drowning.  
The question of whether waterboarding con-
stitutes torture has been in the national con-
sciousness ever since its use on prisoners 
suspected of being high-ranking Al Qaeda 
members was first revealed; the past three 
Attorney Generals of the United States have 
been asked at their Senate confirmation 
hearings whether they believe the technique 
is illegal torture.  Neither Alberto Gonzales 
nor Robert Mukasey were willing to cate-
gorically and unequivocally answer the 
question, which is disconcerting when one 
considers the painful and debilitating nature 
of the technique. 
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 Waterboarding is undoubtedly tor-
ture, by any standard, even Jay By-
bee’s “death or organ failure” criteria, 
because of the extremely painful and 
terrifying feelings it elicits and because 
it does indeed feel very similar to death 
by drowning.  It has been known to cause 
long-lasting psychological damage14 result-
ing in years of anxiety and panic attacks, 
thus fulfilling even the strict criteria for 
“mental suffering” found in the Bybee 
memo.  American courts have even con-
victed Japanese soldiers of war crimes be-
cause they waterboarded prisoners during 
the Second World War (Amnesty Interna-
tional). 
     Other legal experts also consider it tor-
ture.  Daniel Levin, for example, served as 
an Assistant Attorney General in 2004 and 
wrote the more moderate legal opinion on 
the legality of interrogation methods which 
replaced the Bybee memo.  After volunteer-
ing to undergo waterboarding personally, he 
concluded that it would constitute torture 
unless done in a very restricted way, and that 
the Bush administration had not provided 
effective protocols for its application.  Levin 
was fired, perhaps unsurprisingly, after Al-
berto Gonzales became Attorney General 
(Greenburg and de Vogue).  The current At-
torney General of the United States, Eric 
Holder, declared unequivocally that water-
boarding is torture during his own Senate 
confirmation hearing, an indication of a for-
tunate reversal in interrogation policies from 
the Bush administration (Montanaro). 
3. Why abuse was systemic and a result of 
top-down authorization 
     From all the abuses that have been de-
scribed above it should be fairly clear that 
torture carried out by American personnel is 
far more wide-ranging than the mere pres-
ence of a few poorly supervised “bad ap-
ples” could account for.  The memos and 
orders regarding the lack of Geneva Conven-
tion rights for detainees, the authorization of 
indefinite detention and extreme methods of 
coercive interrogation, and legal justifica-
tions for permitting acts of torture and de-
grading treatment all draw a line of causality 
and responsibility between decisions made 
in the White House and mistreatment of 
prisoners throughout the world. 
     Because torture has been universally re-
garded as morally abhorrent for the past few 
hundred years, orders to commit it in the re-
cent past have often been couched in euphe-
misms and permissive messages instead of 
plain language.  Official declarations from 
top American civilian and military leaders, 
including the application of the term “enemy 
combatants” by President Bush and state-
ments from military leaders calling detainees 
“very dangerous” or “like dogs” served to 
dehumanize them and sent signals that inhu-
mane treatment for them would be accept-
able (Roth and Worden 162-164).  The 
President, the Secretary of Defense, or other 
leaders may not have given direct orders to, 
for example, the “night shift” at Abu Ghraib 
to beat, threaten, and humiliate the prisoners 
there, but their actions and words did create 
a tolerant environment that allowed them 
and many of their fellow service members 
throughout the world to consider such be-
havior acceptable.  They are responsible, at 
the very least, for not doing nearly enough to 
prevent these abuses, and possibly for the 
deliberate creation of a pro-torture atmos-
phere (170). 
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 There are also cases of torture and 
inhumane treatment by Americans 
that were approved and ordered by 
high-ranking American officials, like 
the aforementioned “take the gloves 
off” authorization from Rumsfeld to John 
Walker Lindh’s interrogators (165).  He 
also personally signed off on the use of 
stress positions and forced nudity on detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay (Greenberg 237).  
Waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress 
positions were legally validated for use on 
Abu Zubaydah by an official Justice Depart-
ment opinion of which White House and 
CIA leaders were undoubtedly aware (Bybee 
18).  The specifics of the CIA’s “enhanced” 
methods were chosen and initially approved 
by select members of the National Security 
Council, including Vice President Cheney, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and Na-
tional Security Advisor Rice.  Further re-
quests for permission to use the techniques 
in specific cases were consistently approved 
by this group (Greenburg, Rosenberg and de 
Vogue).   
     Prisoner abuse occurred in every theater 
of operations where the “War on Terror” 
was waged, and not because of a small num-
ber of soldiers who didn’t know any better.  
The most senior Bush administration leaders 
specifically condoned the use of illegal 
methods in several cases and fostered an at-
mosphere of disrespect for the rule of law 
and the human dignity of detainees that led 
to many other abuses.  
VI. Why Enforcing and Respecting Inter-
national Law is in the Best Interest of the 
United States 
     Obeying international law isn’t a point-
less endeavor which restricts our actions 
without generating any benefits.  On the 
contrary, adhering to the law would increase 
the standing of the United States throughout 
the world, discredit our enemies, protect our 
soldiers, and convince people all over the 
world to be more cooperative. 
1. Comparative Analysis 
     In discussing the effects of indefinite de-
tention, torture, and cruel, inhumane, or de-
grading treatment on a state’s ability to fight 
a war, especially one with a heavy focus on 
counterinsurgency operations, it will be use-
ful to briefly examine twp other cases of tor-
ture sponsored by democratic states in simi-
lar situations.  They are: first, the arrest of 
hundreds of Northern Irish Catholics and 
experimental torture of about fourteen of 
them by the United Kingdom in 1971; and 
second, the time from 1987-1999 where Is-
raeli security forces were legally allowed to 
use limited levels of coercive interrogation 
techniques against Palestinian detainees. 
a. The United Kingdom and Northern  
Ireland, 1971 
     In the early 1970s the violent unrest 
among Catholics in Northern Ireland was 
rapidly escalating, and the British govern-
ment felt that it had to take drastic measures 
to prevent further deterioration, starting with 
“internment,” indefinite detention with no 
need for evidence or courts.  Hundreds of 
Catholics suspected of membership or sym-
pathy with the Irish Republican Army were 
rounded up and “interned” in August 1971 
(Conroy 4).  The operation was poorly im-
plemented, and several internees were ar-
rested because of outdated intelligence or 
mistaken identity.  Beatings with clubs were 
standard for all the internees (Melaugh).  
Fourteen men were taken from the regular 
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 prison camps to secret locations 
where a course of experimental co-
ercive interrogation techniques focus-
ing on sensory deprivation15was applied 
to them over the course of eight days. 
     The men were forced to stand against 
a wall in a painfully uncomfortable position 
while hooded, beaten severely whenever 
they collapsed from this standing position, 
exposed to cold temperatures, deprived of 
sufficient amounts of food and sleep, and 
subjected to overwhelming sound recordings 
that prevented anything else from being 
heard.  After the end of this ordeal the pris-
oners were moved back to the regular intern-
ment camps (McGuffin 57-60).  During the 
course of these abuses many men suffered 
from both visual and audio hallucinations 
such as music, religious sermons, and fanta-
sies of escape and suicide (73).  In 1978 the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
the five techniques did not rise to the level 
of torture but did constitute inhuman, de-
grading, and illegal treatment, contrary to 
the opinion of the Republic of Ireland and 
Amnesty International.  No British soldiers 
or officials were prosecuted for their roles in 
the affair (Conroy 187). 
     Rather than improving the security situa-
tion in Ireland, the internment and torture 
caused a marked downturn.  Nonviolent 
Irish nationalists refused to participate in 
Northern Ireland’s government out of pro-
test, and Catholics gave more support to the 
Irish Republican Army, which stepped up its 
own level of violent action (Melaugh). 
     The parallels with the United States are 
striking.  In both cases, a government re-
sorted to extreme, extralegal and illegal 
methods of imprisonment and interrogation 
in order to eliminate a threat posed by a ter-
rorist group.  Also in both cases, the “tough” 
methods did relatively little to impede the 
actual extremists and instead hurt mostly 
innocent people, infuriating local popula-
tions and encouraging them to support the 
terrorists’ cause. 
b. Israel during the Landau Commission era, 
1987-1999 
     Israel has had well-known, chronic prob-
lems with its military and security forces 
mistreating Palestinian civilians for years, 
even up to the present day (B’Tselem 
“Absolute Prohibition”).  The problem of 
torture being used on prisoners was espe-
cially acute, however, during a twelve-year 
period when coercive interrogation methods 
were formally legalized. 
     After a pair of scandals concerning the 
lack of transparency and use of violence in 
Israel’s security forces, a commission 
headed by Justice Moshe Landau was ap-
pointed to investigate the matter.  The Lan-
dau Commission concluded in 1987 that the 
security forces should be provided with legal 
guidelines for the use of a “moderate” 
amount of force during interrogations, so 
that they could be effective without having 
to hide their actions from public scrutiny 
(Conroy 213).  The Commission’s proposal 
attempted to limit both the intensity of coer-
cive methods used through official regula-
tions and the number of suspects to which 
they could be applied by limiting their use 
only to prisoners who had knowledge of im-
minent attacks (the “ticking time bomb” sce-
nario) on civilians.  Both attempts failed 
completely 
     The methods used by the Israelis rou-
tinely exceed the limits set in the Landau 
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 Commission’s guidelines rose to 
the level of torture, and included 
sleep deprivation, exposure to ex-
treme temperatures, stress positions, 
sensory bombardment, and violent 
shaking.  At least one Palestinian prisoner 
died from being shaken too much (Roth and 
Worden 36-37).  Security forces also ar-
rested, harassed, and abused the wives of 
men being interrogated in order to force out 
confessions of wrongdoing or otherwise 
pressure the husbands (B’Tselem “Detention 
and Interrogation”). The security services 
also claimed far too many cases of detainees 
having vital information necessitating coer-
cion.  Activists, religious leaders, Islamic 
charity workers, and others – nearly every 
Palestinian interrogated by Israel during this 
time – was tortured by Israeli security during 
this time period, justified by the specter of 
the “ticking time bomb” (Roth and Worden 
40).  The Israeli justice system did not check 
these abuses until the High Court of Justice 
banned all the coercive techniques of the 
security services for violating domestic and 
international law in 1999. 
     The possibility of torture being legally 
allowable in a limited fashion is shown false 
by Israel’s example.  Without absolute legal 
and ethical prohibitions against torture, the 
torturers become desensitized to it and prac-
tice it routinely.  As in the United States, 
allowing limited amounts of violent coer-
cion, even with guidelines and requirements 
for authorization, caused a culture of abuse 
to spread throughout the system, leading to 
widespread violations of international law 
(41-42). 
2. The importance of Geneva Convention 
protections for American soldiers 
     Many military and legal experts have 
called upon the United States government to 
respect the Geneva Conventions, not out of 
love for esoteric, abstract legal principles, 
but for the simple fact that the Conventions 
make our troops safer.  International hu-
manitarian law often protects American sol-
diers when they are captured, and even when 
we are faced with enemies that do not re-
spect the law they should not be allowed to 
bring us to their level.  By placing conflicts 
in which we participate under the auspices 
of the Geneva Conventions and following 
the law we would make it easier to bring jus-
tice to those who would abuse captured 
Americans. Treating our enemies better than 
they treat us demonstrates American integ-
rity, improves our moral standing, and 
makes it more likely that others will follow 
our example in the future (De Nevers 387). 
     John Hutson, who is the President of the 
Franklin Pierce Law Center and a former 
admiral of the United States Navy, articu-
lated very clearly in Congressional hearings 
the importance of the Geneva Conventions 
to the safety of American troops.  He argued 
that war needs to be conducted in a way that 
will allow for peace, that the Geneva Con-
ventions lay out a way to accomplish that 
goal, and that only by complying with those 
laws itself will the United State be able to 
compel others to follow them too.  The pri-
mary concern of all the U.S. policymakers 
who adhered to GC III after 1949 was the 
well-being of Americans, and by deriding its 
requirements we would be removing safe-
guards from our soldiers and rejecting the 
community of nations.  Admiral Hutson 
points out that, as the United States has more 
soldiers deployed abroad than every other 
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 nation in the world combined, we 
should rightfully be the most con-
cerned about maintaining the integrity 
of international humanitarian law 
(Hutson). 
     No less an expert on prisoner of war 
abuse than Senator John McCain has also 
called on the American people to respect 
international law in the wake of the Abu 
Ghraib scandal.  Cautioning against the view 
that the ICRC were mere “do-gooders” and 
that obeying the law hinders our soldiers, 
Senator McCain argued that the Red Cross 
and the Geneva Conventions protect our sol-
diers, and that those who committed abuses 
increased the danger for American troops in 
this and future wars by undermining those 
safeguards.  He also asserted that the United 
States should seek to maintain its integrity 
and standing as a nation governed by the 
rule of law which meets universal standards 
of fair treatment towards prisoners 
(McCain). 
     Military veterans and legal experts alike 
believe that international humanitarian law 
is vital to the well-being of American sol-
diers abroad.  Those who sacrifice to protect 
us need and deserve the protections of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
3. The ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation 
     The reasoning behind the acceptance of 
violent, coercive interrogation methods 
amounting to cruel, humiliating, inhuman 
treatment or torture relies on necessity and 
expediency.  Such methods may be thought 
necessary in order to obtain vital, life-saving 
information from recalcitrant terrorists, or at 
least to obtain it quickly enough to prevent 
an attack or effectively disrupt a terrorist 
network.  While this dilemma between com-
mitting universally reviled acts of brutality 
and possibly allowing thousands of civilians 
to be killed poses an interesting philosophi-
cal question, in actual practice no such di-
lemma exists.  There is no evidence that vio-
lently coercive interrogation yields accurate 
information, whereas there is much evidence 
that legal, non-violent techniques have pro-
duced good results even when used against 
modern terrorists. 
     A study of the effectiveness of interroga-
tion methods was published by the Center 
for Strategic Intelligence Research in De-
cember 2006.  This study crucially found 
that there was no rigorous research on 
whether coercive interrogation methods used 
in the fashion that American personnel had 
been applying them were effective, but that 
the majority of anecdotal information sug-
gested that such techniques were not effec-
tive.  It specifically concluded that the appli-
cation of pain to an uncooperative interroga-
tion subject would be more likely to reduce 
compliance than increase it, and that the use 
of stress-inducing methods impair the cogni-
tive functions of the brain of those subjected 
to them, thus potentially reducing the accu-
racy of subsequently acquired information 
(Fein 35). 
     Academic researchers are not the only 
ones who have claimed that torture does not 
reliably yield accurate information; Ameri-
can military interrogators who have operated 
on both fronts hold the same opinion.  One 
MI officer who served in Afghanistan, for 
example, wrote that degradation such as 
what took place in Abu Ghraib does not fa-
cilitate intelligence gathering, and that all 
the successes he and his unit achieved were 
accomplished without threats,  
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 beatings, or humiliation (Mackey 
xxv). 
     Colonel Steven Kleinman, an intel-
ligence and interrogation specialist of 
the United States Air Force, denounced 
the coercive interrogation as ineffective 
while testifying before Congress.  He ar-
gued that the perceived effectiveness of such 
techniques skewed the public debate over 
torture and that extreme physical or emo-
tional stress should not be viewed as neces-
sary for gathering information or appropriate 
for punishing terrorists.  He stressed that 
properly conducted interrogations induce 
cooperation between prisoners and interro-
gators, whereas coercive methods can only 
force compliance from a prisoner; commu-
nist interrogators often forced confessions of 
war crimes from American prisoners-of-war 
during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for 
example, but these were mostly false and 
therefore useless from an intelligence stand-
point.  Colonel Kleinman also noted, much 
like the aforementioned CSIR study, the 
“natural fragility of memory,” and that coer-
cive methods would not only make it more 
likely for prisoners to be unable to recall 
specific information, but also for them to 
unintentionally give out misinformation.  He 
concluded that coercive interrogation fails to 
extract information from prisoners fully or 
accurately. 
     The specific methods chosen as the 
CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” repertoire 
do not have a history of eliciting accurate 
information.  They were based on methods 
that some members of the United States 
militarily voluntarily undergo in a limited 
fashion during Survival, Evasion, Resis-
tance, and Escape (or SERE) training 
courses.  The reason these personnel are 
trained to resist the SERE techniques is that 
they were used against American POWs by 
the Chinese during the Korean War, a fact 
that high-level government officials who 
approved the enhanced interrogation meth-
ods were unaware of.  The Chinese used 
them mostly to extract false confessions of 
war crimes; a study of their effects published 
in 1956 stated that the Chinese methods led 
to suggestibility and memory loss, not truth 
(Shane and Mazzetti).  The SERE methods 
which became the “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” are more useful for making peo-
ple say what they are supposed to say than 
they are for acquiring accurate intelligence. 
     Debates are ongoing as to what informa-
tion exactly has been gained from using co-
ercive interrogation methods on Al Qaeda 
members.  Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was 
tortured at Guantanamo Bay, accused many 
other prisoners there of affiliation with Al 
Qaeda during his interrogations only to re-
cant, claiming he had lied to stop his suffer-
ing (Zagorin).  It is unclear exactly what in-
telligence was extracted from KSM and 
Zubaydah during the time when they were 
subjected to waterboarding.  Former CIA 
officials and Bush administration leaders 
have claimed that the use of the technique 
led to the acquisition of vital intelligence, 
whereas others (such as FBI Director Robert 
Mueller) have claimed that coercive interro-
gations did not yield intelligence that di-
rectly prevented a terrorist attack.  There are 
conflicting reports about when and under 
what circumstances Zubaydah and KSM re-
vealed information (Shane “Interrogations’ 
Effectiveness May Prove Elusive”).  Even if 
these torturous methods had been necessary 
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 to acquire the information these Al 
Qaeda leaders gave up, the high cost 
of using them16 probably negated the 
benefits of it.  In all likelihood, how-
ever, all the intelligence gained from 
the high value Al Qaeda detainees proba-
bly could have been elicited through legal, 
non-coercive methods. 
     The effectiveness of nonviolent interro-
gation methods has been borne out not just 
historically, but even during the current war 
against terrorists in Iraq.  Following the me-
dia exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, mili-
tary interrogators deliberately set out to use 
different methods, ones that wouldn’t debase 
or degrade prisoners and shock the con-
sciences of American citizens.  These tech-
niques involved respecting prisoners, their 
circumstances and their beliefs, establishing 
connections and incentives for cooperation, 
and compliance with the standards set by 
GC III (Alexander “How to Break a Terror-
ist” 6). 
     Treating prisoners humanely lead to sig-
nificant intelligence coups in Iraq, where 
obtaining information about the operations 
and command structure of Al Qaeda in 
Mesopotamia was of paramount importance 
in preventing suicide bomb attacks and other 
disruptive, violent attacks.  By establishing 
relationships with prisoners and offering 
them (often false) hopes for solving the 
problems that had driven them to violence in 
the first place, military interrogators were 
able to extract vital details about safe houses 
and relationships between important figures 
(136).  On at least one occasion a prisoner 
offered an explanation for why and how he 
had been mistakenly arrested, and the inter-
rogators made an effort to verify his story 
instead of continuing to assume he was ly-
ing, the sort of effort that would have kept a 
lot of innocent people of Guantanamo Bay if 
it had been consistently applied by American 
personnel in Afghanistan earlier in the war 
(166). 
4. Effect torture and indefinite detentions 
have had had on international perceptions 
of the United States 
     The standing of the United States as a 
leader in morality, ethics, and upholding the 
rule of law has suffered tremendously be-
cause of the Bush administration’s illegal 
policies.  Negative reactions to indefinite 
detention and torture have been especially 
strong among Middle Eastern Muslims; 
many of them have been convinced to join 
extremist organizations and fight against the 
United States because of these policies. 
    Global perceptions of the United States 
declined significantly during the Bush ad-
ministration, especially among predomi-
nantly Muslim countries but in Europe as 
well.  How much of that is because of 
American policies regarding detainees 
would be difficult to pin down exactly, with 
other factors such as support for Israel or the 
unilateral invasion of and continued Ameri-
can presence in Iraq contributing as well.  
Regardless, positive views of the United 
States declined in over two-thirds of the 
countries where data was available (Pew 
Global Attitudes Project). 
     Images of the prison at Guantanamo Bay 
and its orange-suited inmates have become 
iconic in predominately Muslim countries.  
Stories of disrespect, abuse, and torture have 
spread through the media and the personal 
accounts of those who have been released 
and returned to their homes.  The sexual 
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 humiliation and abuse of detainees, 
as well as stories of American sol-
diers demeaning the religious tradi-
tions of Muslims, such as beards and 
the sacredness of the Quran, have 
strengthened the idea that the war against 
terrorism is just a front or disguise for a war 
on Islam itself (Sengupta).  This is important 
because research has shown that Muslims 
who believe that the United States is waging 
a war on Islam are more likely to support 
violence against American soldiers and ci-
vilians (Weber 1). 
     The severe worsening of violent attacks 
in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 after the Abu 
Ghraib scandal bears this out.  One veteran 
went so far as to blame half the casualties in 
Iraq on fighters who joined terrorist groups 
because of America’s torture policies, and 
that those policies led to the deaths of about 
as many people killed in the September 11th 
terrorist attacks (Alexander “I’m Still Tor-
tured”). 
VII. Conclusions 
     The illegal and counterproductive meth-
ods of the past must be completely elimi-
nated in order for there to be a chance for the 
United States to restore its reputation, repair 
the damage done to our ability to lead, and 
prevent lawlessness from taking over the 
country.  The Geneva Conventions should 
be applied to the all military operations 
against terrorists, and all military operations 
of the future in general, as both a matter of 
policy and law.  Torture, cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, and any other sort of 
coercive interrogation method must be 
banned absolutely for all U.S. personnel, 
who should be required to use nonviolent 
interrogation techniques instead.  The Guan-
tanamo Bay prison and the black sites 
should be closed, and all prisoners either 
treated as prisoners of war as GC III de-
mands, charged as criminals in a normal 
American court or released.  Those responsi-
ble for torture should be investigated and 
prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. 
     Fortunately, many of these policies are 
already being carried out by the new Presi-
dent of the United States, Barack Obama.  
He has ordered the closing of the CIA black 
sites, banned waterboarding and other tor-
ture methods, and ordered the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base closed and the 
prisoners’ files re-reviewed, a process which 
reportedly will take about a year. 
     Unfortunately, the new policies aren’t 
perfect.  Obama’s Justice Department has 
continued to try to deny prisoners at Bagram 
Air Force Base in Afghanistan the right to 
challenge their detentions (Savage).  Presi-
dent Obama has also stated that he doesn’t 
want the government to investigate people 
responsible for torture as the CAT requires it 
to, although Congressional Democrats may 
press on with that issue regardless.  Addi-
tionally, there will probably be difficulties 
finding places to put many of the released 
prisoners from Guantanamo.  The case of the 
Uighur prisoners, who face difficulties find-
ing new homes because of pressure from the 
Chinese, is probably the most extreme case 
of such problems (Spiegel and Demick). De-
spite this, the new administration represents 
a real possibility for redemption from this 
sordid affair. 
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 Endnotes 
 
1International law can also come from 
custom, which is based on traditions of 
state practice.  It is the oldest form of in-
ternational law, but it can be hard to define 
where customary law exists and exactly 
what its provisions are (Shaw 69).  Treaties 
may codify or reflect preexisting customary 
law, of course, and it is possible for treaty 
provisions to create customary law, depend-
ing on how widely adopted they are and 
other considerations (Shaw 90).     
 
2Article 130 of GC III defines grave 
breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhu-
man treatment, including biological experi-
ments, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, compelling 
a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the 
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a pris-
oner of war of the rights of fair and regular 
trial prescribed in this Convention.”  And 
Article 147 of GC IV defines them as 
“wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, 
including biological experiments, wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a pro-
tected person, compelling a protected person 
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or 
wilfully depriving a protected person of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in 
the present Convention, taking of hostages 
and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military neces-
sity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly.  
 
3See discussion of universal jurisdiction, be-
low. 
 
4Ibid. 
 
5The “exhaustion of domestic remedies rule” 
flows from the legal principle of state sover-
eignty; most human rights treaties explicitly 
include it as a provision (Shaw 254).  
 
6The current Special Rapporteur for torture 
is Manfred Nowak, an Austrian lawyer spe-
cializing in human rights, according to his 
official biography on the OHCHR website.  
 
7The 1949 Geneva Conventions, obviously, 
did not operate during the war.  However, 
the 1929 Geneva Convention afforded a 
largely similar set of rights to prisoners of 
war; that particular Convention definitely 
bound the German government, and the 
Japanese government made an agreement 
with the Allies near the opening of hostilities 
to observe the Convention.  A majority of 
judges at the Tokyo trial later decided this 
agreement was legally binding on Japan 
(Boister 184).  
 
8The Trial of Major War Criminals in Nur-
emberg  and the International Military Tri-
bunal for the Far East in Tokyo both in-
cluded prisoner of war abuse among the war 
crimes with which they charged the leaders 
of Germany and Japan (North) (Boister 
196).  Other trials which followed focused 
on lower-ranking war criminals and also in-
cluded alleged POW abusers from both Ger-
many and Japan (Truman Library) (Kerr 
296). 
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 9The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal established the 
rules and procedure for the Nurem-
berg Trials, and the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far 
East did the same for the Tokyo Trials.   
 
10Specifically, Article 42 of GC IV and Arti-
cle 75, paragraph 3 of AP I state that pro-
tected persons must not be held for longer 
than is necessary, and Article 9, paragraph 3 
states that anyone who is arrested with 
criminal charges must be brought before a 
judge and given a trial within a reasonable 
time frame  
 
11Hamdan was sentenced to five and half 
years of imprisonment, with time already 
spent in Guantanamo Bay counting toward 
it; his sentence will be up in January 2009.  
 
12This was part of a general pattern of at-
tacking men who practiced Islam by target-
ing their religious beliefs.  In addition to the 
aforementioned invasion of space by fe-
males and forced shaving of facial hair, the 
ICRC also gathered credible testimony from 
detainees at Guantanamo indicating that 
guards had physically disrespected the 
Quran, the holy book of Islam (Labott).  
 
13It was in the discussion of the positives of 
ignoring Geneva that Gonzales made the in-
famous comment about the nature of the war 
on terror making parts of GC III “obsolete” 
and “quaint.” 
 
14Because it simulates death by drowning, 
waterboarding is arguably a form of mock 
execution.  One study of the effects of tor-
ture found that psychological problems were 
significantly higher among victims who had 
experienced a mock execution (Conroy 180).  
 
15Specifically, a combination of sleep depri-
vation, starvation, forced standing, hooding, 
and bombardment with white noise, later 
referred to as “the five techniques” (Conroy 
6).  
 
16See section on international perception of 
the United States, below.  
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